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Summary  
Throughout the transition period, Russia was pursuing an energy policy com-
posed of a set of responses to external developments. However, in the wake of 
the 2008 crisis, the government expedited the formulation of a new long-term 
energy strategy aiming to create a comprehensive energy policy to enhance Rus-
sia’s sustained development. 
Externally, Russia’s decisions in 2009 to postpone its accession to the 
WTO and refrain from ECT ratification sounded alarmingly. However, Rus-
sia’s policy course taken in the overall setting was not entirely destructive. By 
proposing a conceptual framework for international energy cooperation (April 
2009), Russia has demonstrated its willingness to become an actor in global en-
ergy governance. Recent transformations in Russia’s energy policy can be read 
within the context of Russia’s aim to conceptualise its vision of energy security 
more holistically. 
Based on an understanding of Russia’s multirole status (producer, ex-
porter, importer, consumer and transiter) in the energy arena, this work features 
the complexity of the content of Russia’s foreign energy policy; it also shows its 
diversity over space and depicts its flexibility over time. This examination is un-
dertaken through the prism of Russia’s energy relations within three geographi-
cal loci: Europe, Central Eurasia and Northeast Asia.
3Russia`s foreign energy policy:
Paradigm shifts within the geographical context of Europe, 
Central Eurasia and Northeast Asia
Introduction
One initial motive for commencing this study was to try to overcome the pre-
vailing normative perception in the scholarly literature of Russia’s energy policy, 
and thereby nuance some key developments in contemporary Russian foreign 
energy policy. 
The purpose of this work is to examine what has changed in Russian 
foreign energy policy throughout the transition period, and why and how it has 
changed. Because of Russia`s multi-role status in the global energy arena and the 
asymmetry observed across the domestic energy complex, the findings a priori 
cannot explain the whole of Russia’s energy policy. Accordingly, the analytical 
lens of this work is set to reflect the concurrent existence of different frames in 
Russia’s foreign energy policy and its flexibility over time.
A well-known fact – that Russia acts simultaneously as an energy pro-
ducer, exporter, importer, consumer and a transit state – is not necessarily in-
corporated into contemporary scholarship on Russian energy. Accordingly, it 
is often disregarded that Russia’s foreign energy policy is influenced by a broad 
range of factors acting both internally and externally.
Domestically, two particular aspects influence energy policy-making. 
First, there is great divergence in the levels of socio-economic development across 
the country. Given the role the energy sector plays in the Russian economy, it 
is considered one of the most effective engines for the industrial and economic 
revival of depressed areas. The most telling example in this regard may be the 
contemporary history of the development of energy resources in Siberia and the 
Russian Far East. Second, Russia’s energy sector itself is not a unified space. 
Quite the opposite: great asymmetry may be observed across the national energy 
complex (a mere glance at the map of Russia’s pipeline network provides the 
best illustration of this). The most developed production base and infrastructure 
are situated in the west of Russia, while such barely exists in the east of Russia. 
Thus, the geography and economics of Russia’s energy resources are those ob-
jective realities which to a considerable degree determine Russia’s energy policy.
Externally, Russia’s foreign energy policy is influenced by global politics 
and economics, by regional and bilateral developments and by the dynamics of 
the energy market. Despite variations in Russia’s approaches within each of the 
geographical dimensions scrutinised here – Europe (first and foremost, the EU), 
Central Eurasia1 and Northeast Asia – some common features allow several 
policy patterns to be defined. 
1 The definition of Central Asia in the present study comprises five countries – Kazakhstan, 
4Russia’s contemporary energy policy towards Europe is significantly in-
fluenced by the EU’s internal regulations and essentially shaped by the R ussia–
EU bilateral arrangements. Russia’s energy relations with the EU reveal, if not 
cooperation per se, then a certain amount of coordination in the policymaking 
process. Despite Russia’s withdrawal from the ECT in 2009, the Russia–EU 
energy dialogue framework remains legitimate. Regarding the EU, Russia has 
demonstrated its readiness to abide by the market principles introduced in the 
EU energy governance and comply with the provisions of the EU’s Third Energy 
Package, the Action Plans, the institutional and regulatory novelties enacted 
after the Lisbon Treaty’s adoption and so forth. Russia regards the EU as a 
counterpart which enables the most comprehensive mode of energy partnership. 
By cooperating with this partner, Russia can effectively achieve its four-fold goal 
of improving energy security, the energy efficiency of the economy and the ef-
ficiency and ecological security of the fuel energy complex (as stated in Russia’s 
Energy Strategy 2030). On the whole, Russia’s energy relations with the EU are 
characterised by strongly symmetrical interdependency (largest supplier – larg-
est consumer), which is intensified additionally by the deep dependency on tran-
sit of both sides. It is due to this complex combination of aspects that Russia’s 
energy policy towards the EU represents the most multifaceted pattern.   
In Central Eurasia, however, Russia’s energy policy is currently under-
going rather profound changes. The somewhat collectivistic pattern of coop-
eration pursued throughout the post-Soviet period and influenced by residual 
Soviet thinking is transforming. This is to reflect new realities of integration 
in the post-Soviet space, especially with the Central Asian countries’ involve-
ment (EurAsEC, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Customs Union 
and so on). However, there is an even more important trigger for Russia’s policy 
transformation. Within the context of the dramatically increased geopolitical 
significance of Central Eurasia, the overall trend in the foreign policies of Cen-
tral Eurasian countries is to expand the scale and modify the nature of their ties 
with the East and West. In the energy realm, this translates into their policy of 
enlarging their international cooperation and diversifying their oil and, espe-
cially, gas exports. This creates a new setting for relations between Russia and 
Central Eurasia. 
As far as Northeast Asia is concerned, Russia’s energy policy can be 
characterised as gradualist, implemented by trial-and-error and pursued pre-
dominantly bilaterally with a very slight degree of institutionalisation. Although 
Russia’s policy on Northeast Asia has many significant variations within the 
mode, its general attribute is that it is based on the greater tolerance of the 
Asian partners for the greater regulative involvement and controlling power 
of the Russian government in the sector. In fact, this omnipresence of the state 
makes the Russian energy sector less risky and more attractive in the eyes of the 
Northeast Asian countries.      
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. However, this work mainly refers 
to the three which possess energy resources: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
Likewise, Central Eurasia is narrowed down here to only four actors (all important in 
the energy realm) to include the three Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. Last, the 
Caspian region denotes five littoral states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Turkmenistan; all are influential energy powers. 
5This work is designed to complement Russian energy policy studies 
in two respects. First, it features Russia’s foreign energy policy not as a single 
monolithic mode; rather, this work perceives Russian energy policy as composed 
of different patterns which distinguish between three policy paradigms, which 
geographically cover Europe, Central Eurasia and Northeast Asia. A second fea-
ture here is a dynamic vision of Russia’s energy policy. Importantly, this study 
focuses not on the evolutionary process per se, but rather on the cause-effect 
chain which triggers the policy transformation. 
This study is organised into three sections. First, it examines the process 
of the formulation and implementation of Russia’s external energy policy in the 
period 1990–2010 (in particular, post-2004). Second, the shifts in Russian en-
ergy policy towards Europe, Central Eurasia and Northeast Asia are analysed. 
Third, the logic behind the changes in Russia’s energy policy regarding each of 
three geographical dimensions is explained. 
6Ideas and determinants informing 
Russia`s foreign energy policy
Until very recently, the predominant notion in studies of Russian energy policy 
has been that Russian energy policy has been well-integrated into Russia’s for-
eign policy, and that oil and gas are the most persuasive instruments of that for-
eign policy. However, Russian foreign energy policy has often been a multiplier, 
not a cause: “If the underlining character of Russian relations with a certain 
country favours rivalry, the politics of energy will take on this character and add 
to it”; “[c]onversely, if in general, a more cooperative spirit prevails, energy will 
be a reason and means to deepen it.”2  
As the geostrategist Nicholas Spykman has noted: “The geography of a 
country is rather the material for, than the cause of, its policy… the geography of 
a state cannot be ignored by men who formulate its policy”. Nevertheless, this 
does not suggest a static perspective on a policymaking environment, because 
“[g]eographic facts do not change, but their meaning for foreign policy will”. 3 
This study treats the geography of energy resources as an increasingly 
flexible category since discoveries of new deposits, new means of transport, ad-
vanced upstream technologies, structural shifts in energy markets and so forth 
add certain political and geopolitical dimensions to purely geographical factors. 
Accordingly, even regions modestly or poorly endowed with energy resources 
can yet become significant actors on the international energy arena. 
The present study has been developed against a neoclassical concept of 
geopolitics, which is concerned with the strategic value of geographical factors 
(resources, access to the sea and so forth) and is closely related to the tradition 
of neoclassical realism in international relations. Positioned within international 
relations, international energy ties will be analysed as prone to cooperation-
conflict tensions and examined through the lens of interdependency (political or 
market dependency). 
The geographical continuum under scrutiny – Eurasia – has tradition-
ally occupied a focal place in geostrategic studies.4 In the aftermath of the Cold 
War, a major risk of economic conflicts and great power rivalry prompted Zbig-
niew Brzezinski to call the region made up of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and 
Afghanistan (with the potential addition of two other “significant geostrategic 
players” – Turkey and Iran) a ‘Eurasian Balkans’, implying there was an ex-
treme volatility and instability here. At the same time, it has been recognised 
that “the Eurasian Balkans are infinitely … important as a potential economic 
prize: an enormous concentration of natural gas and oil reserves is located in the 
region ...”5 Indeed, the geopolitical profile of Central Asia (Caspian Sea region, 
2 Legvold, Robert, Russia’s Strategic Vision and the Role of Energy in Russian Energy 
Policy and Strategy// National Bureau of Asian Research. NBR Analysis. Vol. 19, # 2, July 
2008. pp. 19–20. 
3 Spykman, Nicholas J. (1938) Geography and Foreign Policy// American Political Science 
Review. # 1. February. pp. 28–50. p. 30
4 Ismailov, Eldar (2008) Central Eurasia: Its geographical function in the 21st century// 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2 (50). pp. 7–29.  
5 Brzezinski (1997), pp. 87, 123, 124, respectively.
7Central Eurasia, 6 or more broadly Central Caucasasia)7 has risen so prominently 
that no analysis of contemporary global energy affairs excludes this region.  
By delineating a three-point analytical focus of Russia’s energy policy 
towards Europe, Central Eurasia and Northeast Asia, the principal roles and 
linkages between the sides involved can be depicted as follows:
•	 Russia is a traditional energy supplier to Europe, a rather new partner to the 
Northeast Asian countries and a recognised actor in Central Eurasia; 
•	 Central Eurasian states are established partners of Russia and new suppliers 
to both Europe and the Northeast Asian states;
•	 The EU is a long-established customer of Russia, seeking energy supply di-
versification at the expense of the resources of the Central Eurasian states, 
and therefore worried about the expanding presence of the Northeast Asian 
states in Central Eurasia; 
•	 The Northeast Asian states are habitual customers of the Middle East, per-
sistently probing into Central Eurasia and gradually developing more coop-
eration with Russia. 
The foreign energy policy of a country can be characterised as a system of views 
on the content, principles and main areas for energy cooperation with other 
countries. The actors of foreign energy policy are the states, which operate with-
in a multi-layered structure composed of various entities, including commercial 
and hybrid actors. In pursuing energy policy holistically, the government applies 
6 Consists of the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) plus the three south Caucasus countries of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. See: Marketos, Thrassy N. (2009), pp. 1–2
7 For a debate on geographical terminology about the region see: Papava, Vladimer (2008) 
“Central Caucasasia” instead of “Central Eurasia”// Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2 
(50). pp. 30–42.     
Map 1 Geography of Russia’s energy ties. 
Source: composed by the author (blank map downloaded at 
<http://english.freemap.jp/>).
8a broad array of levers at every level of political competence (national, regional 
and international). 
Concepts of energy may be generalised into two principal classes: those 
developed predominantly along a geopolitical paradigm, and those informed by 
economic thinking. While the former treats energy as a strategic/ public good 
and advocates a zero-sum type of cooperation-conflict relationship (Campbell 
2005, Klare 2008, Blank 2009, Tekin & Williams 2009, Luft & Korin 2010, 
etc.), the latter is preoccupied with the market-oriented concept which views 
energy as a common/ internationally tradable good (Yergin 2007, Finon & Lo-
catelli 2007, Stanislaw 2008, etc.). In reality, these streams of ‘securitisation’ 
and ‘commodification’ are not mutually exclusive, and a government refines the 
entire edifice of its energy policy by emphasising one of the approaches. 8 And 
here lies the seed of most energy conflicts: producers/exporters and consum-
ers/importers of energy resources may operate by the same categories (volume, 
price and continuity), but the parameters they attend to are largely dissimilar, 9 
because the two sides naturally enough accentuate their interests and formulate 
their concerns differently. 
Principally due to this perception gap, in the eyes of Western experts 
Russia’s foreign energy policy is tailored as an offensive and predatory course 
intended to endanger the positions of the states locked into energy relations 
with it. A number of quotations may serve to illustrate this: “Russia – a carbon 
economy which invades Georgia, threatens Ukraine and the Baltics and moves 
on the Arctic ...”10 Meanwhile, Stephen Blank claims that Russia has vested 
economic motivations; in fact, it “would not object to being paid in rubles for 
its energy sales to China thus abandoning the dollar as a medium of interstate 
exchange…”, hoping “not just to weaken the US but also to generate demand 
for rubles and create a closed trading and currency block in the CIS.” According 
to Blank, economic benefits are aspired for as a means to nourish Russia’s Great 
Power ambitions. He also writes the following: “In this regard its [Russia’s] 
motivations are not unlike those of Nazi Germany in the 1930s that also pur-
sued a similar policy towards Eastern Europe to subordinate those economies 
to its own system”.11 However, this seems a rather far-fetched and highly alarm-
ist opinion. There are other less categorical approaches which involve different 
prospects; William Enghal, for example, underscores that Russia “is using its 
energy as a diplomatic and political lever to ‘win friends and influence (EU) 
people’ ”, but he nevertheless opines that Russia is pursuing “a fascinating, 
8 See: Energy security: economics, politics, strategies, and implications (2010)/ Carlos 
Pascual and Jonathan Elkind, eds. Washington: The Brookings Institution, and Energy 
and the transformation of international relations: Towards a new producer-consumer 
framework (2009)/ Andreas Wenger, Robert W.Orttung, and Jeronim Perovic. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
9 Alhajji A.F. (2007) What is energy security? Definitions and concepts// OGEL. Vol. 6Issue 
3. November 2008.
10 Helm, Dieter (2008) Climate Change, European Energy Policy and the Copenhagen 
Summit: Time for Realism? New College, Oxford. Lecture Series in Environmental and 
Ecological Economics. October 21.
11 Blank, Stephen (2009) Russia’s New Gas Deal with China: Background and Implications// 
Northeast Asia Energy Focus. Vol. 6, No. 4. Winter 2009. p.27.
9highly complex multi-pronged energy strategy”.12 A similar prospect is provided 
by Joseph Stanislaw: he views Russia as “an energy superpower” which “uses 
its vast resources as the basis of economic development and as an instrument 
for carrying out domestic and foreign policy.”13 Ariel Cohen’s assessment is also 
that Russia is “pursuing a comprehensive energy strategy, which masterfully 
integrates geopolitics and geo-economics.”14 
In reality, it is hard to distinguish between purely (geo)political and 
purely economic considerations that shape the contour of Russia’s foreign en-
ergy policy. Importantly, while tackling this imperative task of sustainable do-
mestic socio-economic development, the Russian government emphasises en-
ergy resources and the energy sector as the principal components of Russia’s 
transformational dynamism (refer to Graph 1).   
Reacting to rather profound shifts and anticipating new changes in the domes-
tic and external setting, Russia has revisited its strategic views on its role in 
the international system. The fundamentals of Russia’s foreign policy are estab-
lished by: the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC), July 12, 2008; the Statement by RF 
President on principles of foreign/security policy, August 31, 2008; the National 
12 Enghal, William (2010) High-stakes Eurasian Chess Game: Russia’s new geopolitical 
energy calculus. 30 March < http://www.voltairenet.org>
13 Stanislaw, Joseph A. (2008) Power play – Resource nationalism, the global scramble for 
energy, and the need for mutual interdependence. Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions. 
p. 9
14 Cohen, Ariel (2009) Russia: The flawed energy superpower in Energy security challenges 
for the 21st century: a reference handbook/ Gal Luft and Anne Korins, eds. Santa Barbara: 
ABC CLIO. p.101.
 
Graph 1 Energy policy in the context of national priorities.
Graph composed by the author.
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Security Strategy until 2020 (NSS);15 and, the Military Doctrine (MD). 16 Each 
document also addresses certain aspects of Russia’s foreign energy policy. 
The Foreign Policy Concept holds that while Russia should ensure sus-
tainable development of the domestic economy and help maintain balance in the 
world’s energy markets, Russia should also continue to build up and modernise 
the capacity of the fuel and energy industry. Additionally, if one assumes that 
Russia’s energy security is linked to stability of demand and the security of tran-
sit, Russia aims to strengthen its partnership with the leading energy producers 
and develop an active dialogue with the consumers and transit countries. This is 
in accordance with the principles of energy security adopted by the G8 Summit 
in Saint Petersburg in 2006. 
The National Security Strategy underscores the geopolitical importance 
of the regions possessing energy sources, such as the Middle East, the Barents 
Sea, the Arctic,17 the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Indicative of the crucial im-
portance attached to energy (both resources per se and security) is the fact that 
the National Security Strategy mentions this aspect in the chapters dealing with 
“Russia in the World Community”, “National Defence”, “Raising the Quality 
of Life” and “Economic Growth”. The National Security Strategy defines energy 
security as one of the major focuses of national security in the economic sphere. 
It is emphasised that to ensure national and global energy security, Russia seeks 
multilateral cooperation in developing international energy markets based upon 
the WTO principles, international exchange in energy-saving technologies and 
alternative energy sources.
Russia’s foreign policy has always been influenced by a ‘West vs East’ 
intellectual debate.18 However, contemporary Russian foreign policy is under-
pinned by the tenet of multipolarity signifying a shifting balance between Eu-
ropeanism and Eurasianism. Due to traditionally well-established and com-
mercially beneficial energy ties with the West, Europeanism has long remained 
a dominant platform in Russia’s energy policy. Eurasianism, which embraces 
both the West (Euro-Atlantic) and the East (Asia-Pacific) flanks, has come to be 
adopted as a policy mode which enables lingering uncertainties to be handled 
and potential opportunities to be developed. Importantly, pragmatic considera-
tions became a major trend within both Europeanism and Eurasianism. Due 
to this pragmatism, and due to the increased awareness of China’s immensely 
strengthened status in international affairs, a group of Sinophiles has formed 
within the Eurasianist camp.19 
The arrival of pragmatic thinking into Russia’s foreign policy-making 
was galvanised by an extremely favourable external conjuncture in oil, gas and 
15 The Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation (May 12, 2009) < http://
www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>
16 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. February 5, 2010 < http://news.kremlin.
ru/ref_notes/461>
17 Here, the National Security Strategy correlates to the Foundations of the Russian 
Federation’s National Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and beyond (September 18, 2008). 
18 For analysis of Russian foreign policy, see works by Pavel Baev, Andrey Tsygankov, 
Dmitrii Trenin, Sergey Karaganov, Paradon Rangsimaporn, Jeffrey Mankoff, Tsuneo 
Akaha, etc.  
19 Tsygankov, Andrey (2009) What is China to us? Westernizes and Sinophiles in Russian 
foreign policy. IFRI. Russia/ NIS Center. December.
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other raw material markets. Strengthened economically by export windfalls, 
Russia started seeking a more influential role in global affairs: it proposed, for 
instance, the concept of energy security in 2006, and the concept of global en-
ergy governance in 2009. 
Although energy is often referred to as Russia’s foreign-policy trump 
card, whose use is necessarily tainted by coercion and blackmail, this seems 
to be a somewhat narrow interpretation. In effect, there has been an increas-
ing understanding that energy is one of the key elements of Russia’s ‘economic 
card’.20 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the economic component of 
energy policy has become even more important. This is indicated by the Long 
Term Concept for Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federation 
until 2020, highlighted by President Medvedev in his article “Go, Russia!”, and 
emphasised in his 2009 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Rus-
sian Federation.21 
Energy Strategy 2030
Following a dramatic change in the global energy market, the Russian govern-
ment was forced to revise the Energy Strategy until 2030 (hereafter referred to 
as “the Strategy”), and adopted it on November 13, 2009.
In the new Strategy, the government emphasised a new approach where-
by objectives for the development of the national energy sector are set as pivotal 
parameters. The new Strategy is built upon an assumption that it is the national 
Fuel Energy Complex (FEC) itself that crucially defines its own forward trajec-
tory and shapes the trends within the entire economy. This time around, it is not 
the world oil price but the tempo of post-crisis economic recovery that has been 
set as the point of departure for the Strategy’s two scenarios. The first scenario 
envisages a quickly recovering national economy with the current consequences 
of the downturn tackled before 2015. In turn, the second scenario envisions a 
slower pace of overcoming the repercussions of the crisis, with full recovery 
expected by 2020/2022.
The Strategy outlines three phases, but the timeframe is stipulated by 
whether or not the concrete parameters of the development of the Fuel Energy 
Complex have been achieved. Logically enough, the Strategy envisages a substan-
tial overhaul of the Fuel Energy Complex during the first stage (2013–2015) to 
become an additional engine pushing the domestic economy towards post-crisis 
recovery. During the second phase (2016c2020/2022), an array of cutting-edge, 
highly efficient innovations and technologies will be introduced; greenfields will 
become operational and significantly expand the sector’s production and export 
capacity. In the period 2021/2023–2030, considerably improved energy effi-
ciency coupled with the enhanced use of non-fuel energy sources (nuclear, solar, 
wind and so on) are expected to boost Russia’s robust economic development. 
20 I am here referring to a candidate of sciences degree in economics with specialization on 
National economy planning and management, defended at the Saint Petersburg Mining 
Institute in 1997. The thesis is quoted in Harley Balzer (2005), The Putin Thesis and 
Russian Energy Policy, Post-Soviet Affairs, 21/3. pp. 210–225, and in [Hiroshi Kimura 
(2008), Putin’s energy strategy].
21 Long Term Concept for Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federation 
(2008); Medvedev, Dmitry (2009), “Go, Russia!”, September 10; Presidential Address to 
the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. November 12, 2009.
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The Strategy pursues an array of aims across four major dimensions: energy se-
curity; the energy efficiency of the domestic economy; the economic efficiency of 
the Fuel Energy Complex and, the ecological security of Fuel Energy Complex.
Concerning the diversification of energy development and export, the 
Strategy 2030 saliently identifies new geographical dimensions. More specifi-
cally, it envisages the accelerated development of new oil and gas deposits in 
East Siberia, the Far East, on the Yamal peninsula and on the Arctic shelf. Ac-
cordingly, export flows are projected to switch more towards the East (refer to 
Map 2).
As regards the provisions for foreign energy policy, the strategic aim is formu-
lated to make the most efficient use of Russia’s energy potential. This is to com-
prehensively integrate Russia into the world energy market, strengthen its clout 
in energy affairs and maximise its economic benefits.22 To this end, the docu-
ment states, Russia has to adequately represent its interests through the avenues 
of cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian 
Economic Community, Northeast Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion, the EU,23 and other states and international organizations. Coordinating 
its energy policy with OPEC and the GECF is also necessary, as is enhancing the 
formation of the united Europe–Russia–Asia energy space.24 The more specific 
objectives of Russian foreign energy policy can be summarised as follows:
22 Doklad Ministra energetiki RF S.Shmatko na zasedanii Pravitelstva Rossii 27.08.2009 po 
rassmotreniyu proekta Energeticheskoi Strategii Rossii na period do 2030 goda (Energy 
Ministry’s Presentation on Russia’s Energy Strategy until 2030 at the Government meeting 
on August 27, 2009 )// [http://minenergo.gov.ru/press/doklady/1420.html]
23 Listed in the order of the original document. Refer to [http://minenergo.gov.ru/press/
doklady/1420.html]
24 Provisions relating to Russia’s external energy policy were not highly appraised by Prime 
 
Map 2 Shifts in the geographical structure of Russian oil and gas ex-
ports in per cents. 
Map composed by the author based on the Strategy 2030 data.
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•	 representation of Russia’s national interests in the regulatory frameworks of 
the world energy market system (development of an internationally accept-
able concept which allows for the balancing of the interests of exporters, im-
porters and transiters and defends against volatility and short-term specula-
tive factors; assurance of transit security and insurance against transit risks; 
development of regulatory frameworks within international organisations; 
collaboration on bi- and multilateral norms on access to energy infrastruc-
ture and downstream sector; harmonisation of national and international 
regulatory systems; legal settlement of territorial disputes in the Arctic, the 
Caspian Sea and the South China Sea and so forth); 
•	 geographical diversification of energy export (expansion towards Asia while 
maintaining European markets; enhancement of energy production and in-
frastructure; participation in regional energy alliances; expansion of access 
to overseas energy infrastructure – ports, super tankers and so on);   
•	 structural diversification of exports (LNG, various value-added petro- and 
gas chemical products and so forth); 
•	 assurance of stability of demand and prices in export markets (improvement 
of long-term oriented transit relations; access to transit infrastructure; devel-
opment of spot trading with the growing role of the rouble; promotion of 
new Russian oil blends; improvement of pricing policy; 25 development of a 
system for forecasting and analysing international energy markets; data and 
information sharing; technological and technical cooperation and so on);
•	 promotion of the Russian energy companies’ overseas activity (intergovern-
mental agreements; backing of Russian companies’ operations in the EU, 
Northeast, East and South Asia, Middle East, Central Asia and Latin Amer-
ica; Russian and foreign energy companies cross-ownership; Russian ener-
gies companies’ multifaceted cooperation with transnational corporations; 
development of joint businesses down the value-added chain and so forth);
•	 establishment of a favourable environment for international cooperation in 
technically challenging and risky energy projects in Russia, including shelf 
and Arctic projects, and so forth.
Paradigm shifts in Russia’s energy policy
Although it was intended to match the overall course of market reforms, Rus-
sian energy policy in the 1990s suffered numerous failures due to continuing 
Soviet practices. In a sense, energy policy was built upon the perception that the 
energy sector had to further maintain the role of donor for the entire economy. 
This conclusion can be drawn by analysing the structure and content of the 
policy documents approved throughout the 1990s/early 2000s.26  
Minister Putin, who has characterised the Strategy as “not ambitious enough”, pointing 
out that the document addresses too scantily Russia’s standing in global energy affairs.
25 Speech by Minister of Energy RF Sergei Shmatko at International Conference on Oil. 
Moscow. 27.10.2009 <http://minenergo.gov.ru/press/doklady/2190.html?sphrase_
id=7238>
26 Before the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030 was approved in 2009, 
the main documents were: Concept of Russian energy policy in new economic Conditions 
(1992), Main Provisions on Energy Strategy of Russia and Main Directions of Energy 
Policy and the Restructuring of the Fuel Energy Complex of the Russian Federation 
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On the whole, energy policy throughout 2003 was rather fragmentary 
and inconsistent with the course of market reforms which commenced in the ear-
ly 1990s.27 The goals formulated in the programme documents had been poorly 
achieved, and were consequently dragged over into the next paper on energy 
policy, only to remain unfulfilled. By about 2004, the overall domestic politi-
cal environment had shifted towards greater power for the state. For example, 
from 2000 the ‘oligarchs’ were ousted from the media, then regional presiden-
tial representatives were introduced to curb the power of regional governors. In 
2003, the oligarchs were ejected from the State Duma when the liberal parties 
which they financed and which were their main lobbying conduit were forced 
out. Finally, the compulsory dissolution of Yukos and the redistribution of its 
assets to state-controlled companies signalled the advent of state capitalism, a 
system of state entrepreneurship backed by mechanisms of selective support for 
loyal state-oriented companies and punitive measures against entities opposing 
vertical federal power.   
A liberal policy course in the Russian oil and gas sector had come to 
an end by 2004; since then, policy has been based upon heavier governmental 
control. The State’s interests in the gas and oil industries were carefully guarded 
through nationalisation, resulting in a higher degree of monopolisation, slug-
gish competition in the sector and its chronic overall inefficiency. A deliberate 
governmental course cut back on foreign investment. Though the necessity was 
fully realised for additional investment in the exploration and production of 
resources, amending the regulatory basis to allow for the greater participation 
of foreign partners and freer access for domestic small and medium-sized com-
panies was postponed. 
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, Russia faced all the limitations of a 
resource-dependent economy and the need for a qualitatively new pattern for 
economic development was emphasised. It was assumed that the fundamental 
improvements in the system of resource management could assist in attaining 
this objective. 
To sum up, Russia’s energy policy in the post-Soviet period can be char-
acterised as evolving through several phases (refer to Graph 2).     
until 2010 (1995), Main Provisions on Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020 (2000), and 
Energy Strategy until 2020 (2003).
27 Miller, N.E. (2009) Gosuadrstvennaya energeticheskaya politika Rossii v kontekste 
postsovetskih preobrazovanii 1990-h gg.// Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie. Vypusk 18, 
Mart. 
 
Graph 2 Periodisation of Russia’s energy policy. Graph composed by the author.
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Triggered by the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent economic recession, 
shifts in Russia’s energy policy stretch along a multidimensional agenda. Do-
mestically, there is a course towards innovative and technologically advanced 
socioeconomic development that necessitates foreign capital and expertise. Ex-
ternally, a more pragmatically-oriented approach to developing energy ties with 
the West and the Former Soviet Union helps sort out a broad range of hindranc-
es which emerged throughout the post-Cold War history of relations. Likewise, 
Russia’s pragmatic move eastwards promises to tackle several tasks concurrent-
ly. Domestically, there is the economic development of the vast eastern territo-
ries which otherwise would further decay and aggravate national security. From 
the international perspective, Russia stands to benefit both economically and in 
stature in international affairs from closer cooperation with major Asian econo-
mies. Interestingly, Russia – perhaps for the first time in its history – is trying to 
implement an authentically Eurasian vision of its place, roles and behavioural 
patterns. 
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Russia`s energy policy towards the EU, 
Central Eurasia and Northeast Asia
Russia’s energy profile tops the world rankings. According to BP,28 Russia pos-
sesses the seventh largest proven oil reserves (6.3 per cent of the world’s) and is 
the second biggest world producer (12.4 per cent). Russia’s proven gas reserves 
account for 23.4 per cent (the world’s biggest), and its production share is some 
19.6 per cent (the world’s largest). In terms of oil export, Russia is the world 
number two, while in gas export it is the world’s largest supplier.  
At present production levels, Russian oil reserves will last for another 
21 years and gas reserves for another 80 years. According to the estimates of the 
Energy Strategy 2030, by 2030 oil and gas production is expected to expand to 
530–535 mn t and to 885–940 bcm respectively. However, a number of factors, 
such as investment in exploration and the development of greenfields and infra-
structure, as well as trends in both domestic and external demand, will define 
future dynamics. 
The most prolific oil and gas provinces are located in Ural-Volga, Ti-
man-Pechora and Western Siberia. Subsequently, Russia’s system of oil and gas 
export infrastructure is westwards orientated (see Map 3). The diversification of 
export routes into the East is a recent trend triggered by the commercial devel-
opment of new deposits in East Siberia and the Far East (Sakhalin).
The conventional analytical frame argues that Russia’s conduct of external en-
ergy relations is mostly led by ambitions consistent with Great Power politics. 
Russia’s behaviour is frequently described in categories such as ‘great’, ‘super’ 
28 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2009.
 
Map 3 Russia’s oil and gas pipelines. Source: U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration <online>.
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‘energy power’, ‘flexing energy muscle’, ‘using oil/gas weapon’. To what extent 
does this cliché hold true? Though a definite criterion is lacking, a few indicators 
may help reveal principal nuances. To start with, Russia is Europe-dependent 
for 64 per cent of its gas exports and 79.6 per cent of its oil exports. Moreover, 
Russia relies on Central Asia for the gas imports that cover as much as 20 per 
cent of Russia’s commitments before Europe. Lastly, Russia is transit-dependent 
as 78 per cent of its gas exports pass through Ukraine, and some 20 per cent go 
via Belarus. The latter is also home to the northern route of the Druzhba pipe-
line which enables the shipment of 28 per cent of Russian oil exports to Europe. 
Apparently, Russia’s ultimate energy leverage against Europe and Cen-
tral Asia is more likely a myth than an objective reality. Russia’s profound de-
pendency on Europe translates into its vulnerability to fluctuations in demand 
in its largest external market and makes its export revenues highly volatile. 
Furthermore, this Europe-oriented model of energy exports largely defines the 
dynamism of Russian domestic output, which in turn generates wide-ranging 
social and economic impacts on the oil and gas producing regions and on the 
national economy as a whole. 
Russia’s energy relations with the EU are a telling example of symmet-
rical interdependence. A number of reasons for this can be thought of. Two 
aspects, physical capacity (pipelines) and commercial arrangements (long-term 
supply contracts), linked the supplier with the consumers in the west especially 
tightly and created a pattern of relations which finds accommodating new re-
alities rather difficult. This is especially true of the gas segment: piped conven-
tional natural gas is increasingly being replaced by LNG delivered by tanker and 
traded by spot contract. Another strand of complexity stems from a ‘third party 
factor’, which always plays a significant role in Russia–EU energy relations. On 
the whole, Russia’s energy ties with the West are highly intertwined and cannot 
easily be replaced or transformed by any of the parties involved. 
By contrast, the infrastructure for Russian gas exports is non-existent in 
the East: the first export-oriented oil pipeline was opened there as recently as De-
cember 2009. Importantly, some advantages from Russia’s closer involvement 
with its Asian partners can be discussed. Possibilities exist to establish energy re-
lations based upon a state-of-the-art mode with the most progressive techniques 
employed and the most efficient technologies probed. Suffice it to note, Russia’s 
first LNG plant has been built in Sakhalin (and that is why there is no urgency 
to stretch gas pipelines), Russia’s deepest and most technologically challenging 
offshore wells were drilled on the Sakhalin shelf, Russia’s higher quality oils – on 
which Russia counts in its aspirations to improve the price of Russian crudes in 
the world market – are yet again found in East Siberia and Sakhalin.29 Finally, 
by expanding its exports to Asia, Russia is seeking to capitalise on Asia’s already 
enormous demand for oil and gas which is projected to increase.  
In the following, most principal aspects of Russia’s energy relations with 
each respective geographical dimension are discussed in greater detail. 
29 At the moment, there are five greatly different content blends by sulphur: Vityaz (0.18 per 
cent), Sokol (0.23), Siberian Light (0.58–0.6), ESPO (0.65–0.75), and Urals (1.2–1.39 per 
cent).
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Russia–Europe: energy ties and energy policy 
Despite all the speculation concerning the EU’s insecure position in terms of 
Russian energy supply, Russia’s position in the European market may be no less 
precarious. A number of factors, such as the ongoing structural transformation 
in the gas market (with the sequels being lower price, shorter terms of supply 
contracts and so forth), the EU’s policy of diversification of both energy sources 
and sources of supply and so on not only endanger future Russian supplies, but 
– given that energy flows create a chain of effects – also affect Russia’s trade, 
investment, technology exchange and a great deal besides.
In 2009, the economic recession and structural shifts in the gas market 
itself have resulted in less demand for Russian gas. Apparently, Gazprom is 
increasingly challenged in retaining a lucrative European market. Current trans-
formations of the international gas market shape an environment with which 
Gazprom’s business practice is highly incompatible. Gazprom’s contracts are 
usually of 20–30 years duration with a ‘take-or-pay’ clause. Another disadvan-
tage of Gazprom’s practice is pricing, more precisely, the gas price is tradition-
ally pegged to the oil price. Amidst the economic recession, such commercial 
terms have additionally reduced the attractiveness of Gazprom. 
Russia–EU Energy Dialogue 
In the recent past, Russia–EU energy relations were affected by a range of dis-
courses. Such included the EU’s enlargements in 2004 and 2007, the Russia–
B elarus dispute in early 2006, the especially acute controversies between Russia 
and Ukraine in 2007 and 2009 and the Russia–Georgia war in August 2008. 
These events deepened the divergences in the partners` views, expectations and 
ambitions. Questioning Russia’s reliability as a major supplier, the EU has moved 
to strengthen a common external energy policy. In 2009, the Eastern Partner-
ship Energy Security Platform30 was established to become an additional means 
(to the Energy Community Treaty31 and the ETC) to conduct a robust external 
energy policy, of which the neighbourhood and enlargement policies are the es-
sential elements. The EU is developing the Eastern partnership (with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and Energy Community 
Dialogue with the producers (EU–Russia, EU–OPEC, EU–Norway, and EU–
A frica) as well as Dialogue with transit/consuming countries (Ukraine and Tur-
key). New initiatives include the establishment of partnerships with Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Africa and Iraq, as well as the development of the 
legal frameworks for supply routes, such as Nabucco IGA and Corridor Agree-
ments.
Russia’s energy relations with the EU are framed by the EU–Russia En-
ergy Dialogue, which was launched in 2001 with the aim of fostering bilateral 
energy relations. In 2006, three thematic groups were established to deal with 
energy efficiency, energy market development and forecasting and scenarios. 
However, relations between Russia and Europe, traditionally technically es-
30 Eastern Partnership. Platform 3. Energy Security. November 5, 2009 < http://ec.europa.
eu/external_relations/eastern/platforms/docs/platform3_051109_en.pdf >
31 Signed by 34 countries, it aims at establishing a single regulatory framework for trading 
energy across Southeast Europe and the EU on the same terms.
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tablished, technologically tuned and commercially safe, had been deteriorating 
steadily over the past years. 
The EU’s November 2008 energy policy package has exposed the Un-
ion’s willingness to cut down on its dependence on Russian energy supplies. To 
do so, the European Commission has adopted the “EU Energy Security and Soli-
darity Action Plan: 2nd Strategic Energy Review”, envisaging the diversification 
of the EU’s energy supplies.
Rather unexpectedly, given the severe impacts of the 2008 crisis on the 
Russian economy, Russia has refused to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty, citing 
its interest in establishing a more just system for international energy coopera-
tion. Additionally, Russia – EU official relations moved onto somewhat less se-
cure ground when the EU–Russia Partnership Agreement elapsed in 2007. Effec-
tively, Russia–EU energy dialogue became almost the only framework through 
which to maintain bilateral energy relations. 
The overall objective of the Russia–EU energy partnership is worded as 
follows: “to enhance the energy security of the European continent by binding 
Russia and the EU into a closer relationship in which all issues of mutual con-
cern in the energy sector can be addressed while, at the same time, ensuring that 
the policies of opening and integrating energy markets are pursued.”32 Logically, 
strong, mutual dependency in the energy sector results in energy security becom-
ing a pivotal aspect in EU–Russia energy relations. However – and the excerpt 
from the document perfectly mirrors this – Russia’s energy security is not re-
ferred to as a matter of equal importance. More concretely, the document states 
that the objective of bilateral dialogue is to ensure the energy security of the EU 
and transform Russia’s related policies into a mode more compatible with the 
EU’s paradigm. Unsurprisingly, the two sides face difficulties in achieving this 
seemingly shared goal of ensuring energy security. 
Nord Stream, Nabucco and South Stream: grands projets et les petits partis 
Three gas pipeline projects – Nord Stream, Nabucco and South Stream – are 
of major significance for future Russia–EU gas relations. They also involve the 
interests of many smaller and large Eurasian powers and the US.  
2009 witnessed clear progress in the Nord Stream gas pipeline project, 
and this progress resulted from various deals which were not necessarily inter-
linked with the project itself. Reportedly, Finland has decided in favour of the 
project due to Russia’s reciprocal moves, i.e. Russia’s promise not to increase 
export duties on timber until 2011; meanwhile, Denmark’s opposition was sof-
tened by Russia’s support for the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenha-
gen in December 2009. Accordingly, by the end of 2009 all the governments 
in the Baltic Sea region had granted construction permits to Nord Stream to 
use their Exclusive Economic Zones for the pipeline. This enabled the project’s 
launch on April 9 2010. Importantly, the Russian government assigned the 
project a central role in fostering international cooperation in the energy sector. 
In particular, foreign companies possessing adequate technical, technological 
32 EU – Russia Energy Dialogue. March 19, 2009 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=MEMO/09/121&format=HTML&language=en>
20
and financial potential for the development of the Arctic projects are repeatedly 
invited to develop joint undertakings in Russia.33 
For a number of reasons explained in more detail below, the future of 
the South Stream project, which originally stemmed from Russia’s discontent 
with frequent transit irregularities with Ukraine, is now not as definite. The same 
applies to the prospect of the Nabucco pipeline project, which was initiated by 
the EU as the means to safeguard its energy supply security. The two projects are 
in a sense competitors for both upstream sources and consumer markets. While 
political and geopolitical factors (Iraqi supply, transit through Turkey and Geor-
gia and so on) diminish the competitive status of the Nabucco, the project seems 
much more attractive economically. By some estimates, the Nabucco’s tariff is 
€1.7/1000 cm/ 100 km, while South Stream’s is €3.8/ 1000cm/ 100km. Simi-
larly, an evaluation of wellhead-to-market costs for Nabucco is €77/1000cm, 
which is significantly lower than €106/1000cm for South Stream.34    
Strictly speaking, Russia–EU gas relations are not bilateral as they are 
heavily influenced by third countries. While some of these countries act as po-
tential competitors to Russia, challenging its status as a supplier, the others, such 
as transit states, are at power to affect equally the interests of Russia and the EU.  
In recent years, Turkey’s importance in Russia–EU gas affairs has in-
creased remarkably. Bidding to become a transit hub for Europe-oriented gas 
flows, Turkey shows “a true exercise of Byzantine diplomacy”,35 sending out 
mixed signals to both Russia and the EU. Despite the Turkish government’s deci-
sion to join Nabucco in 2009 (approved by parliament on March 4 2010), vital 
talks between Turkey and Azerbaijan did not advance. Apparently, the 2009 
Turkey–Armenia Protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and opening up 
their shared land border have added some complexity. Additionally, Turkey 
unveiled its own plan with regard to Azeri gas, envisioning the shipments to 
Greece and Italy bypassing Nabucco. By the same token, on August 6 2009 
Turkey granted access to Russia’s South Stream gas pipeline through its part 
of the Black Sea. In return, Russia has pledged to support the Samsun–Ceyhan 
pipeline. This will carry Russian oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean 
and competes with the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, which is preferred by the 
West.36 A second Blue Stream pipeline was also approved. 
Likewise, Azerbaijan’s simultaneous involvements with Russia, Iran 
and the EU are no simple matter. Under the deal signed between Gazprom and 
SOCAR (the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) from January 1, 2010 
Russia imports 1 bcm in 2010 (2 bcm in 2011–2014) paying Azerbaijan $350 
per thousand cm of natural gas – the highest price Russia has ever paid for natu-
33 Norwegian companies were characterised as such valuable partners. On June 5, 2009 
Gazprom and StatoilHydro concluded a MoU on joint development of the Arctic shelf, 
Shtokman, etc. Concluded on April 27 2010, the Russia–Norway agreement on the 
disputed zone in the Barents Sea comes as additional impetus for international cooperation 
in the High North. 
34 Nabucco: The most commercial Southern Corridor gas pipeline project. RWE Supply & 
Trading GmbH. November 13, 2009.
35 Engdahl, William (2010) High-stakes European chess game: Russia’s new geopolitical 
energy calculus. March 30 <http://www.voltairenet.org>
36 This may lead to Russia’s abandonment of its Burgas–Alexandroupolis project.
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ral gas from the Caucasus or Central Asia.37 According to the long-term con-
tract, Azerbaijan intends to sell all the gas from the Shah Deniz II offshore field 
to Russia, the very same field Nabucco hopes to tap. The agreement between 
Russia and Azerbaijan sets the stage for future bilateral cooperation whereby 
Azerbaijan’s natural gas exports would pass through Russian territory, thus 
thwarting Europe’s plans to transport Azeri natural gas via Turkey (or anywhere 
but Russia). Another blow to Nabucco was Azerbaijan’s decision in early Janu-
ary 2010 to supply Iran with gas. 
Commissioned in December 2009, the Turkmenistan–China gas pipe-
line can also be seen as a development undermining the Nabucco’s resource po-
tential. Turkmenistan has lately become known for its rather generous promises 
about gas supply, including for Nabucco. However, the China-oriented pipeline 
which is already operational and some other smaller scale projects underway, 
which are also reliant on Turkmen carbons, raise questions about the availabil-
ity of Turkmen resources for Nabucco. This may well increase the significance 
of Iranian gas as a potential source for Nabucco, which is rather ironic given the 
backing of the United States for the pipeline.      
Transit in transition 
From Russia’s perspective, dependency on transit certainly aggravates its energy 
security. The disruptions in supplies to Europe inevitably undermine Russia’s 
reputation as a reliable supplier and trigger the EU’s policy for diversification 
of energy imports. Attempting to bypass the transit states, Russia stepped in a 
‘pipeline rush’ promoting the North Stream and South Stream gas projects and 
the BPS II oil pipeline. 
Three countries, Ukraine, Belarus and Poland, play an important – if 
not a critical – role in Russia’s energy relations with Europe.38 
The Russia–Poland transit case involved a principal disagreement about 
the tariff structure and control of the EuRoPol Gas Transit Gas Pipeline System 
(joint venture between Gazprom and the Polish national gas network operator, 
PGNiG, founded in 1993). Gazprom demanded greater control over the joint 
venture and insisted on reducing transit tariffs. On January 27 2010, Russia 
signed an agreement extending gas transit through Polish territory till 2045. The 
parties agreed that tariffs should bring guaranteed but not vast profits to both 
companies, Gazprom and PGNiG. Another agreed contract envisioned Russia’s 
annual 10.27 bcm gas exports to Poland until 2037. 
Ukraine plays a major role in the transit of Russian gas to Europe. Ac-
cordingly, Russia has always been interested in obtaining some form of owner-
ship over the transit networks in Ukraine. Ukrainian opposition to a greater 
foreign presence has nevertheless prevailed. Positively, Ukraine is no longer seen 
as entirely a victim of Russia’s hard-line energy policy. A number of experiences 
have questioned the fairness of Ukraine’s transit policy. In particular, it has been 
pointed that “[t]reaties are dismissed as soon as they are signed, and daily bar-
gaining among those in office wins the day over the idea of pacta sunt servan-
37 For gas from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, Russia pays $300 per 1000 cm.f
38 The Druzhba oil pipeline traverses Belarus (Northern route) and Ukraine (Southern 
route). The gas pipelines Brotherhood, Soyuz and Northern Lights pass through Ukraine, 
while the Yamal gas pipeline crosses Belarus and Poland.
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da…” and it has been recognised that “[t]he EU itself encountered an enormous 
difficulty of conducting its own long-term energy policy in the circumstances of 
Ukraine’s ‘a very short-sighted approach … ‘spot governance’, the absence of a 
rule-of-law culture, official unaccountability…, and a clannish way of running 
business to the detriment of the common good.” 39 
Having suffered a number of disruptions in supply, in 2009 the EU 
multiplied its efforts to prevent any possible losses from irregularities in supply. 
In 2009, the EU proposed a programme called UGTS Priority Objects, Mod-
ernisation and Reconstruction40 for the modernisation of Ukraine’s gas trans-
mission system (UGTS). The EU has emphasised the importance of monitoring 
gas relations between Russia and Ukraine and intensified efforts in introducing 
comprehensive preventative measures. On November 16 2009, the Russia–EU 
Memorandum on Early Warning Mechanism41 was signed to complement exist-
ing frameworks within the Gas Coordination Group, the Oil Supply Group and 
so forth. 
For Russia, aside from the political implications, the transit has a rather 
clear economic dimension – the transit fee. Following the inauguration of Presi-
dent Yanukovich, a new round of Russia–Ukraine gas negotiations resulted in 
major agreements on April 21 2010. Russia agreed to a 30 per cent drop in the 
price of natural gas sold annually to Ukraine. In exchange, Ukraine extended 
Russia’s lease on a naval base at the Black Sea port of Sevastopol for 25 years. 
Although this Russia–Ukraine agreement has been coined a ‘gas-for-fleet’ deal, 
the bet was of a much larger scale. Apparently, the two parties are set to drasti-
cally enhance cooperation on various fronts (from joint projects in transport 
aircraft construction and nuclear power to building a grain terminal on the 
Black Sea coast). 
In April 2010, Russia suddenly proposed merging Gazprom and Nafto-
gaz. Apparently, Russia had some initial confidence that Ukraine would be will-
ing to consider taking bilateral ties to new heights. Such high stakes could in-
clude the Russia–Ukraine negotiations on settling the territorial dispute over the 
Kerch Strait (a recent and inspiring example for Ukraine is the Russia–Norway 
April 2010 agreement on the demarcation of the disputed zone in the Barents 
Sea). Another persuasive argument – if not Russia’s trump card – is approval 
received for South Stream from all the countries involved in the project.42 As 
President Yanukovich has repeatedly noted, Ukraine is seriously worried about 
the implementation of the South Stream. This will certainly be painful for the 
Ukrainian economy as the transit fee for transporting over 140 bcm of Russian 
gas and over 40 mn t of Russian oil is a considerable addition to the budget, 
which Ukraine would under no circumstances be willing to lose. 
39 Nies, Susanne (2009) Ukraine – a Transit Country in Deadlock? Four scenarios. Ifri 
Programme Energie Paris–Bruxelles. November. pp. 2, 3.
40 Available here: <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/energy/events/eu_ukraine_2009/
bekker_en.pdf>
41 Memorandum on an Early Warning Mechanism in the Energy Sector within the 
Framework of the EU–Russia Energy Dialogue <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/
bilateral_cooperation/russia/doc/reports/2009_11_16_ewm_signed_en.pdf>
42 Austria has even suggested claiming some exemptions from the EU’s regulation for this 
project, presumably with the aim of ensuring the project’s commercial feasibility.
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On the whole, after a period of especially estranged bilateral relations, 
Russia and Ukraine appear to be seeking reconciliation, with pragmatism un-
derpinning their undertakings.
Concerning Russia–Belarus transit relations, the linkage is significant 
volume-wise. Belarus is responsible for the supply of oil to Germany and Poland, 
which are dependent on Russian oil for 15 per cent and 75 per cent respectively. 
Russia and Belarus have developed “a very specific energy-political” 
model, which “… fitted the immediate political and economic interests of the 
ruling elites on both sides ... For Russia, it implied huge costs in return for… 
largely symbolic benefits”. 43 Meanwhile, Belarus has benefited significantly.44 
The Russia–Belarus energy relationship is not a smooth one; there have 
been a number of rows (in 1997, February 2004, December 2006–January 2007 
and December 2009). As with the Ukraine, their bilateral energy relations per-
fectly mirror the political discourse. If throughout the Yeltsin years (1994–1999), 
the Belarusian president was trying to “build up its own political position in 
Russia” by playing a lost-empire card, starting from 2000, faced with Russia’s 
new policy, he “began to focus more and more on the independence of Belarus” 
(a course that has led to a thaw in relations with the EU since 2008), as that, he 
believed, would be a guarantee of his “personal political survival”.45 
The 2009 Russia–Belarus disagreement arose over oil price and customs 
duties for Russian oil to be delivered under a new contract to Belarus via the 
Druzhba pipeline. The previous contract (which expired on December 31, 2009) 
provisioned a reduced rate of customs duties for Russian oil. Since the parties 
failed to reach a consensus by the beginning of 2010, the supply was levied at 
regular rates. Belarus expressed its utter discontent with such an arrangement, 
pointing out that, if anything, this undermined the very basis of the Customs 
Union, enacted from 2010. In fact, all along Belarus has been exporting the 
oil products manufactured from much of 22 mn t of Russian oil to the EU. Al-
though Russia has been receiving as much as 75 per cent of export duties from 
oil products sold abroad by Belarus, the overall scheme still allowed Belarus to 
maintain the earnings flow at about 1/3 of national GDP,46 making up around 
a third of Belarus’s export revenue, while Russia’s loss of profit is estimated at 
$10 bn annually. 47 For the new contract, Russia reasonably proposed that only 
oil designated for Belarus’ domestic needs would be duty-free, but Belarus has 
43 Balmaceda, Margarita (2009) At a crossroads: the Belarusian–Russian energy-political 
model in crisis/ In Back from the cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009. Chaillot Paper No. 
119. p. 79, 87.
44 According to the IMF findings for 2004 for instance, the preferential prices at which 
Russia sold energy to Belarus subsidised the latter’s economy to the effect of 10 per cent 
of GDP, with 6–7 per cent resulting from subsidised gas prices and 3 per cent from oil 
prices.
45 Gromadzki, Gregorz (2009) Belarusian foreign policy – change or continuity? / In Back 
from the cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009. Chaillot Paper No. 119. p. 94.
46 Rubtsov, Ivan (2010) “Druzhba” druzhboi, a preferentsii vrozj// Expert No. 3(689) 
January 25.
47 Shishkunova, Elena, and Aglamishyan, Varvara (2010) Lozhka nefti// Izvestia. January 
18.
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been reluctant to agree to such a novelty in principle. As a persuasive argument, 
Belarus has chosen to threaten Russia by increasing a transit fee.48 
In the gas sector, Belarus hosts a transit route for Russian gas, receiv-
ing a transit fee and gas for internal consumption at a rather attractive price 
($148 1000 cm as of 2009). It was agreed to increase the price of gas for inter-
nal consumption (to some $174 1000 cm), but as recent developments in June 
2010 have shown, Belarus keeps paying its gas bills at the 2009 price ignoring 
Gazprom’s protests about its growing debt.  
In the past, the bilateral course has become far from heartfelt. Arguably, 
the Russia–Georgia war played its part in Belarus’ course to further distance it-
self from Russia (as it certainly sees itself within the zone of Russia’s “privileged 
interests”). Russia’s response was economic – a boycott of Belarusian dairy 
products and, amidst the mounting financial crisis, Russia first delayed and then 
cancelled altogether the final $500 mn tranche of a $2 bn loan. Belarus’ retalia-
tion was not economic – instead, it boycotted a June 2009 summit of the Collec-
tive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Recently, Belarus has demonstrated 
its willingness to become an active party in the EU’s Eastern Partnership process. 
The latest developments of 2010 all serve as illustrations of the Belarusian ‘re-
bellious’ course: such developments include: the exports of Venezuelan oil; the 
activisation of contacts with China (solidified by the low interest Chinese credits 
and interest-free loans of $1bn and $9bn); and, Lukashenko’s gesture of good-
will to grant asylum to the disgraced Kyrgyz President Bakiev in April 2010.
For the Belarusian transit disease, meanwhile, Russia has prescribed 
the BTS II pipeline from Unecha (near the Russia–Belarus border) to Ust Luga; 
its construction began in 2009. As may be detected from the Russia–Belarus oil 
transit skirmish, the matter is largely Belarus’ responsibility. When faced with 
the ramifications of its current policy, however, Belarus may well regret its lack 
of cooperativeness when this option was at its disposal. One discourse to learn 
from is Ukraine–Russia relations before 2010. While President Yuchenko em-
phasised Ukraine’s Western priorities by pursuing its accession to NATO and 
the EU, relations with Russia were steadily tailing off. When Russia retaliated 
by attempting to circumvent the Ukraine as a transit route for Europe-oriented 
energy flows, the probable implications of such short-sighted Ukrainian policy 
became rather explicit. Although Ukraine’s systemic failures and miscalculations 
in its policy towards Russia were admitted promptly by Yanukovich after his 
accession to the presidency49 and a more constructive period in bilateral rela-
tions resumed, it remains unclear whether Russia will decide to implement its 
ambitious South Stream pipeline project. If completed, the South Stream project 
along with Nord Stream would make transit volumes passing through Ukraine 
shrink by some 50–60 bcm: this would render the lion’s share of the Ukraine’s 
existing energy transmitting infrastructure inoperative50 and cost the economy 
enormous amounts of lost transit revenue. 
48 Oil.Ru News. January 15,2010 <http://www.oilru.com/news/157165/>
49 Yanukovich v sluchae izbraniya prezidentom aktiviziruet otnosheniya s Rossiiskoi 
Federatsiei. December 25, 2009 <http://rian.com.ua/politics/20091225/78261535.html>; 
Ukrainskie tyazhelovesy: dva podhoda k Rossii. December 21, 2009 <http://rian.com.ua/
analytics/20091221/78258437.html>
50 Viktor Yanukovych, Leader of Regions Party and presidential candidate quoted 
by RusEnergy. December 21, 2010 <http://www.rusenergy.com/ru/news/news.
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Indeed, the transit states, long regarded as hostages to Russia’s tough 
policy, were in fact rather successful actors within a certain segment of the en-
ergy export business. The years of the oil and gas bonanza, however, made the 
transit states less concerned about pursuing a more balanced approach which 
took into account primary (Russia) and final (European importers) consumers’ 
interests. Meanwhile, competition in the transit segment itself has been gradu-
ally growing.51 
As a whole, the transit problem which occasionally arises between Rus-
sia and the Former Soviet Union seems largely due to disagreement about the 
mechanisms of sharing the benefits from energy prices subsidised by Russia. Ar-
guably, subsidised supplies have created a certain type of corruption (nourished 
by revenue from the reselling of Russian oil and gas abroad at world prices) 
in the FSU countries involved in Russian energy transit. It therefore no longer 
seems apt to analyse Russia’s energy relations with the transit states through the 
prism of ‘angels and devils’ (who is which in this scenario so popular with the 
western audience, is clear). 
In relations with Europe, transit will always be an element of Russia’s 
energy security. Before embarking on a bypassing policy as a means to tackle 
transit dependency, it is therefore important to weigh up accurately the pros and 
cons of the existing transit routes and assess the actual needs for developing an 
expensive pipeline web. 
Russia and Central Eurasia
Russia’s approach towards Central Eurasia is perceived either as an attempt 
to regain the status of a Great Power, or keep other states, first and foremost, 
China,52 from gaining solid ground here. The truth lies somewhere in between. 
Encapsulating Russia’s relation into the Great Power game format – even for 
purely analytical purposes – clashes with reality, wherein the Central Eurasian 
states are increasingly pursuing their own strategic goals in both the regional 
and international arenas. Recent developments in the energy sector, not exclu-
sively in oil and gas but also in uranium, have demonstrated that Russia does 
not stand guard over the natural resources of the Central Eurasian states. In 
contrast, a new pattern of cooperation seems to be emerging, with a format in 
which the parties make their choices based on weighing up the pros and cons of 
their decisions.       
   
Energy in Central Eurasia: potential and conditions for cooperation
As recently as 2005, a chapter in a comprehensive volume on energy and secu-
rity issues53 and the future of Eurasian transportation did not pinpoint Turkmen-
istan as a prominent energy producer. In recent years, however, Turkmenistan 
php?id=48641>
51 Winrow, Gareth (2009) Turkey, Russia and the Caucasus: Common and diverging 
interests. Chatham House. Briefing Paper. November REP/ EP BP 2009/01. p.21.
52 Baev (2008).
53 Kalicki, Jan H. and Elkind, Jonathan (2005) Eurasian transportation futures in energy 
and security: Toward a new foreign policy strategy (2005)/ Ed. by Jan Kalicki and David 
L.Goldwyn: Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, The John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore. pp 149–174.  
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has emerged as possessing remarkable gas reserves and has become a significant 
actor in the global energy arena. The other energy powers in the region are 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. While Kazakhstan has significant oil resources, Az-
erbaijan is endowed with more or less equal amounts of oil and gas. 
Nowadays, practically every major energy actor has some interest in 
Central Eurasia. Russia has traditionally been involved in large-scale energy 
cooperation there, initially with the republics of the former Soviet Union, later 
with these states as staunch allies. In the wake of the demise of the former Soviet 
Union, the Central Eurasian states have pursued various policies, but given the 
economic hardships they were facing, the development of natural resources has 
become a priority for all of them. Though Russia was initially a major partner 
and mediator in the energy contacts of the Central Eurasian states, in the second 
half of the 2000s these states have gradually started mastering more independ-
ent lines. 
Relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia 
are pivotal to Russia due to two principal considerations. First, this is a realm 
enabling Russia to expand cooperation in many fields, particularly with Kaza-
khstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Second, this cooperation helped Russia 
fulfil its export commitments, chiefly to Europe and especially in the pre-crisis 
period of high energy demand. During the period of an exceptionally favour-
able conjuncture on the energy market, and while seeking to benefit additionally 
from possessing an expansive resource base, the Central Eurasian states started 
revising their energy policies. Currently, the geographical diversification of en-
ergy ties is becoming their principal aim. 
It is not exactly true that this move took Russia by surprise, but it did 
force Russia to adjust its own course. After a period of uncertainty when vari-
ous tactics were examined, Russia has managed to renew the grounds for energy 
cooperation with the Central Eurasian states to somewhat mutual satisfaction. 
It may be said that energy cooperation between Russia and the Central Eurasian 
states is largely a product of the intersected ties and intertwined interests of the 
national political elites. The national governments are explicitly willing to main-
tain a certain degree of coordination in the sector. One of the factors at play here 
is Russia’s distinctiveness compared to the Western countries: Russia “…does 
not link its assistance to political conditions”, and the Central Asian regimes are 
particularly “appreciative of this”.54 
Russia has long played a structuring role in the development of the 
Central Eurasian hydrocarbon trade. Although in a sense a transit state, Russia 
has nevertheless acted as a re-exporter (strictly speaking, even as an exporter), 
taking advantage of the Soviet-era energy transport infrastructure. However, it 
became clear that Russia could no longer control either the flows or prices of 
Central Asian gas and oil. The increasingly diversified energy relations of the 
Central Asian states – above all, thanks to expanded ties with China, but also 
with Iran (gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan) and Europe (oil from Kaza-
khstan via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline) – strip Russia of its dominance.
The reality in Central Eurasia is that Russia is increasingly confronted 
with the need to move away from the unilateral leadership model prevalent 
54 Laruelle, Marlene (2009) Russia in Central Asia: Old History, New Challenges? EUCAM. 
Working Paper 03. September. p. 5. 
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throughout the 1990s and in the early years of Putin’s presidency. It also needs 
to accept power-sharing as a new modus vivendi with rising regional powers 
(Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, in particular) and with other powerful external 
players in the region. In this context, one remarkable shift is that Russia attaches 
increasing importance to such regional organizations as the CSTO, the EurAsEc 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. 
The independent pipelines of the Central Eurasian States: implications for Russia
As Table 1 shows, Central Eurasian countries have a significant potential to 
boost their energy exports. Turkmenistan, as by far the largest possessor of nat-






Turkmenistan 50 (?) 110–115 South Yolotan up to 14 trn 
cm; 15–20 bcm offshore
Uzbekistan 15 40–45 15 bcm Lukoil Overseas and 
10–15 bcm Karshi
Kazakhstan 11 32 Kashagan, Tengiz, 
Karachaganak
Azerbaijan 8 15–20 Shah–Deniz
2009 was a remarkable year for concrete achievements in the energy policy 
of the Central Eurasian states. In the midst of the world economic crisis, they 
significantly enhanced their status in world energy affairs. They have expanded 
energy export routes and proposed a number of new projects for international 
cooperation. 
In implementing foreign energy policy, the Central Eurasian states at-
tach primary importance to a pragmatic approach. Several initiatives have been 
proposed by the Turkmen President, one of which (Reliable and Stable Transit 
of Energy and its Role in Ensuring Sustainable Development and International 
Cooperation) was adopted by resolution of the UN General Assembly in De-
cember 2009. 
December 14 2009 witnessed a climax in Central Eurasian modern en-
ergy policy. On this date, widely regarded as historic and signalling a new era 
for the independent entry of Turkmenistan into the global gas arena, the Trans 
Asian gas pipeline was put into operation. This pipeline, the longest ever, con-
nects Turkmenistan with China through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (the TUKC 
gas pipeline). 
In light of this, Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan’s joint plan to 
build a new gas pipeline circumventing the Caspian Sea is now being questioned. 
Earlier, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan had promised to provide the Caspian 
Gas pipeline with up to 20 bcm of gas annually by 2009–2010. However, their 
Table 1 Central Eurasian gas export potential. Table composed by the author based on various 
sources.
28
significantly increased engagement in many other large-scale pipeline projects 
casts doubt over their ability to live up to their export commitments. 
Until very recently, around two-thirds of Turkmenistan’s gas was sold 
to Gazprom via the Central Asia Centre Pipeline (CACP). However, the scope 
of Turkmenistan’s gas export to Russia stands to become much more modest. 
Russia, thus, turns into but one actor in the Great Energy Game taking place in 
Central Eurasia. By pursuing a pragmatically-oriented energy policy, Russia has 
chosen to secure its role in Central Eurasia by optimising the price and volume 
terms of the existing deals and by compromising on new agreements.
Russia in Northeast Asia
There is no agreed vision on the geographical contour of Northeast Asia. In 
most instances, Northeast Asia as a whole encompasses the People’s Republic of 
China (China), Japan, the Democratic Republic of Korea (the DPRK), the Re-
public of Korea (Korea), Mongolia and the Russian Federation (Russia). In the 
present study, Russia’s energy relations are analysed with three Northeast Asian 
states: China, Japan and Korea. 
Russia’s relations with the Northeast Asia countries have seen ups and 
downs and have developed at different tempos. A ‘triple shocks’ framework, 
suggested by a Korean expert, seems to be helpful in identifying the main cur-
rents that have steered Russia towards the Northeast Asian states. “The ‘triple 
shocks’ – the end of the Cold War, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the 9/11 
terrorist attacks – each played a role in pushing forward … Russian evolution 
from neofeudal governance55 and a strategy of disengagement to neoabsolutist 
governance and a more neomercantilist strategy”.56 
In the early 2000s, two competing visions were formed of the future 
development of Russia’s oil and gas sector in relation to Northeast Asia. One 
was planned by private companies (Yukos, Lukoil, TNK and Sibneft), and was 
‘ideologically’ inspired by Michael Khodorkovsky. Had this grand plan been 
implemented, the geography (and geopolitics) of Russia’s energy relations would 
have been significantly entrenched along two arches – one Chinese (with the 
Angarsk–Daqing oil pipeline as the pivot) and one American (the Western Si-
beria–Murmansk oil pipeline) with a major role played in the sector by private 
business. However, it was decided to develop Russian energy with the govern-
ment’s active involvement. 
The geographical priority of Russia’s energy policy in Northeast Asia 
had initially been set on China alone (the Angarsk–Daqin oil pipeline). Sudden-
ly, however, Japan changed this scenario. It is now admitted that it was Japan 
that managed to convince the Russian government not to play the ‘Chinese card’ 
only, but to make a decision opening up prospects for engaging with the broad-
er Asia Pacific Rim.57 This Japan did through its promises to allocate sizable 
55 This refers to a federal system which emerged after the demise of the USSR with its centre 
– periphery relations.
56 Northeast Asia. Ripe for integration? (2008)/ Ed. by Vinol K.Aggarwal, Min Gyo Koo, 
Seungjoo Lee, Chung-in Moon. Berlin: Spinger-Verlag. p.180.
57 For more detail see: Shadrina, Elena (2004) Energy cooperation in Northeast Asia. JIIA 
Fellowship Occasional Paper 27.- Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs 
<http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/russia_centre/h15_cis/12.pdf>, and Shadrina, Elena (2004) Is 
Pacific oil pipeline to breathe new life into Far Eastern economy?/ in [Report on the year 
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amounts of investment in energy, transport and social infrastructure in East Si-
beria and the Far East.58 Apparently, shifts in Japan’s and later in Korea’s energy 
import policies envisaging the involvement of Russian resources contributed to 
Russia’s decision to set about developing the resource base in the Russian East. 
A policy emphasis on the expansion of energy cooperation with Asian 
countries, called ‘the Asian vector’, was proclaimed in 2003 in the Energy Strat-
egy until 2020. It was initiated to reduce Russia`s over-dependence on the Euro-
pean market, minimise risks associated with transit, and, not least, enhance the 
economic development of Russia’s eastern regions. Additionally, to meet these 
ambitious goals in the East, the government has approved a range of sector- and 
region-specific initiatives.
Russia’s oil and gas relations with the Northeast Asian states
The Northeast Asian countries are distinguished by their profound dependence 
on energy imports and especially high vulnerability in terms of Middle Eastern 
supplies (see Table 2). 



















2006–2030 2009 2030 1994 2008 1980 2002 2030
China 2 9 3.7 51.3 77 18.9 42.2 -3 0 18
Korea 5 2/9 2.0 100 100 63.9 82.2 77 84 77
Japan 3 1/1 0.5 99.7 100 67.3 88 88 82 78
Already major consumers, the Northeast Asian states are expected to demon-
strate growth in future demand. China’s primary energy demand is forecast to 
become the largest in the world, surpassing that of the US by around 2020 and 
that of all European countries by 2035 (refer to Graph 2 on next page).   
2004 study on Russia and CIS countries` Resource Strategy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
Japan Institute of International Affairs. March 2005]. 
58 East Siberia (federal subjects of the Siberian Federal District: Krasnoyarsk Krai, Irkutsk 
Oblast, Buryat Republic and Zabaikalsky Krai), and the Far East (federal subjects of the 
Far Eastern Federal District: Amur Oblast, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, 
Magadan Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Sakha Republic, Sakhalin Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai, 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug). 
Table 2 Energy security indices for Northeast Asian states in per cent. Table composed by the 
author based on various sources.
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Graph 2 Northeast Asia in world primary energy demand, b toe. Source: Kanekiyo Kensuke 
(2010) Geopolitics of energy and global warming in Northeast Asia. April. IEEJ <http://eneken.
ieej.or.jp/data/3109.pdf>
Russia is the only energy self-sufficient economy in Northeast Asia. Objectively 
speaking, data on Russia’s hydrocarbons located eastwards are inexact, as only 
6 per cent of the continental shelf and 7.3 per cent of the onshore area have been 
covered by geological exploration. By some estimates, 25 per cent of Russia’s 
total gas and 15 per cent of its total oil resources are located in East Siberia and 
the Far East. 
Gazprom estimates gas reserves at 52.4 tn cm on-shore and 14.9 tn 
cm off-shore, part of which could benefit the Northeast Asian states. In the 
vast area of East Siberia and the Far East, Gazprom is pursuing an ambitious 
Eastern Gas Programme, which envisages gas output at over 200 bcm annually 
by 2030 (from 8 bcm in 2006). Four centres (Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Yakutia 
and Sakhalin) of gas production in East Siberia and the Far East are scheduled 
to be activated depending on the degree of their current development. Initially 
domestically-oriented, the Sakhalin–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok and Yakutia–
Khabarovsk–Vladivostok gas pipelines have recently been planned to become a 
part of the transport network enabling future exports to China and Korea. 
2009 witnessed remarkable developments in Russia’s cooperation with 
Northeast Asia in both the gas and oil sectors. The Sakhalin II LNG plant was 
launched, from which Japan receives up to 65 per cent of the plant’s output, 
while Korea imports about 15 per cent of the LNG. Due to an ambiguous situa-
tion for Russian LNG in the US the Japanese and Korean markets are extremely 
attractive to Russia. Unlike the situation in North America, the competition for 
LNG in Northeast Asia may even decrease because of the reduction in LNG 
exports by Indonesia and Malaysia, traditional suppliers of LNG to Northeast 
Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia are facing a two-fold challenge: depletion of do-
mestic gas reserves and growth in domestic energy demand).
Gazprom has long hoped to open up a supply relationship with China 
(this is believed to be one reason for Gazprom’s interest in Sakhalin I), but no 
fruit has yet been yielded. Russia and China signed a memorandum of under-
standing (MoU) in March 2006, agreeing on up to 80 bcm of annual exports to 
China from 2011. A similar agreement was signed with Korea in October 2006. 
In principle, two export routes have been considered: the western one (the Altai 
project relying on the Siberian fields and directed to China) and the eastern one 
(gas of Sakhalin origin transported through the system of domestic pipelines for 
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both internal consumption and export to China and Korea). Due to apparent 
disagreement with China on price (Gazprom has pushed for netback parity with 
its sales to Europe, but China refused this as unacceptably high), little progress 
has been achieved in subsequent years. Thus, the prospects for piped gas exports 
to the Northeast Asian states remain blurred. 
Oil exports, however, are enabled through the shipments of oil extract-
ed in Sakhalin and in East Siberian fields. In 2009, 39.6 per cent of oil extracted 
at the Sakhalin I and II projects was sent to Korea, 38.4 per cent to Japan, and 
the remainder was split evenly between China, USA, Philippines, Taiwan, Thai-
land and New Zealand. 
Another route for oil deliveries to Northeast Asia was opened up by 
the launch of the first stage of the East Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline on 
December 28 2009. The projected capacity of ESPO-1 is 30 mn t: 15 mn t are 
to be sent to China (by rail, before the Skovorodino–Daqing spur is completed); 
another 15 mn t are to be transported (also by rail, before ESPO-2 completion) 
to Kozmino port, from which the oil is shipped to a number of consumers.
Strictly speaking, the ESPO project has yet to be become commercially 
viable, and it is uncertain whether it will ever generate profits. Seeking to facili-
tate the eastwards shift in Russian oil export, the Russian government decided 
to subsidise ESPO-borne exports by suspending export duties on East Siberian 
oil (to be partially re-enacted from July 2010) and through a preferential trans-
port tariff for ESPO crude (set at $50/t, while the actual cost is $130/t). The 
Ministry of Finance is strongly opposing any further extension of these ‘eastern 
tax holidays’, pointing out the budget losses of some 120 billion roubles in 2010 
alone. 
Russia’s prospects of strengthening its position in the Asian oil market 
seem rather positive. Due to China’s oil demand, the Asian market is larger and 
more vibrant by far than the European one. Also, the infrastructure enabling 
Russian oil export to the Asia Pacific Rim (APR) is gradually coming in place, 
thereby solidifying Russia’s energy ties with the APR and transforming these 
relations into a long-term format. For Russia, closer involvement with the Asian 
market is a plus because this market is most likely to yield a higher price, com-
pared to the European one. For their part, the Northeast Asian economies, tradi-
tionally suffering a burden of the Asian premium, would enjoy newly emerging 
oil flows. Adding to the economic benefits, the time required to deliver Russian 
exports to the Asian markets is significantly shorter – just five days – while the 
delivery of supplies from the Middle East, Africa and Brazil requires at least 
two-week’s sailing. Also, considerations of the security of sea lanes (especially 
the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca) favour a switch towards Rus-
sia’s greater share in Northeast Asian oil imports.
Some analysts anticipate certain structural shifts in Russia’s oil exports: they 
argue that as the ESPO enables swings between the West and the East, it can 
therefore significantly change Russia’s exports dynamics. This view, though, 
should be taken with a pinch of salt. Even provided that economics of distance 
is not a decisive factor because the network tariff levels off the profitability of 
West- and East-oriented exports, the swaps, at least the spontaneous ones, are 
rather unlikely because Russian oil companies have a more or less clear geo-
graphical concentration of production, and the export linkages are established 
subsequently (quite literally, the companies producing oil in Russia’s West tend 
to export it westwards). 
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Some industry experts consider another possible sequel of the diver-
sification of Russian exports – an upwards shift in the price for Russian oil. 
Pointing to the IEA reports about Russian crude exports being rerouted from 
the ports on the Baltic and Black Seas towards the East, they predict that tighter 
Russian supplies to the European markets will push up the price of Urals, Rus-
sia’s main export blend (traditionally traded at some 70 cents discount against 
Brent). However, the price shifts should be scrutinised in a broader framework 
in which the higher quality parameters of the new Russian ESPO blend are a 
more plausible reason for the higher prices.
Despite the fact that the overall environment for international relations 
in Northeast Asia remains strained by such complex nodes as territorial disputes 
and proliferation issues, Russia’s linkages with Northeast Asia in the energy 
realm are becoming increasingly vibrant. 
Japan is Russia’s traditional partner, who significantly contributed to 
the development of the Far Eastern energy projects and demonstrates its interest 
in further expansion of energy cooperation. With China, Russia has the most 
diversified energy contacts, including the nuclear and electricity sectors. None-
theless, the bilateral energy dialogue is often formatted in a way which seems to 
benefit China to a greater extent. One case exemplifying this particularly aptly 
is the price for Russian energy resources. China has in fact managed to gather 
more negotiating power over Russia thanks in particular to its deeper involve-
ment with the Central Asian states, but also thanks to China’s stronger financial 
capabilities, which have been extended to Russian Rosneft and Transneft in 
the form of loans. Perhaps the larger format of the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganisation energy community may help Russia level off its status against China. 
Finally, Korea, which compared to China and Japan initially appeared relatively 
less interested in energy cooperation with Russia, has come to form oil and gas 
ties with Russia.
Rather differing features of Russia’s energy ties with each of the North-
east Asian states can be combined under a broadly defined pattern in which 
inter-governmental dialogue determines the overall discourse. That is why the 
spatial image of energy cooperation in Northeast Asia can best be presented in 
a hub (Russia) and spoke (the rest of the countries in the region) perspective. 
There are yet only a few multilateral forums of a mainly ad hoc nature that 
inform the framework for the energy cooperation between Russian and North-
east Asia. In the near future, bilateral formats and some external frameworks 
(ASEAN, SCO and so forth) are more likely to provide the grounds for energy 
cooperation between the Northeast Asian states.
33
The transformation of the policy 
paradigms
While analysis informed by normative perceptions maintains that Russia uses 
energy as a political tool, a more comprehensive examination reveals that Rus-
sian foreign energy policy is shaped by various domestic and external factors. 
Below, some principal facets of transformation pertaining to each geographical 
dimension are discussed.   
Russia–EU: from assured supplier to reliable partner
Assessing the potential for dialogue to succeed    
As suggested by international relations theory, there are several prerequisites for 
dialogue to be launched, and certain aspects should be fulfilled for the dialogue 
to be constructive: 
1. the preferences of the sides concerned should be clearly defined and converge 
to some degree;
2. the existing environment for the dialogue should be assessed and its desir-
able parameters formulated; and 
3. the negotiation process should be formatted to enable the most positive out-
come possible from the application of the two sides’ bargaining power.
In the Russia–EU energy dialogue, although the parties’ preferences have some-
what differing dimensions, the two sides accentuate similar areas of main im-
portance.
First, investment. While the EU mainly seeks the means to ensure invest-
ment in supply diversification and the construction of new cross-border trans-
mission infrastructure, Russia is additionally concerned with increasing invest-
ment in resource exploration and production and in the expansion of energy 
transport infrastructure. Furthermore, in pursuing its goals, the EU prioritises 
the rules of fair competition and market liberalisation, while Russia appears 
set on continuing – albeit with a number of alterations – a line of state energy 
governance. Since the 2008 crisis, although the Russian government has repeat-
edly stated its resolve to improve the investment climate to ensure more foreign 
capital in the Russian energy sector, the creation of a transparent and predict-
able environment safeguarded against sudden regulatory alterations remains a 
challenge. It therefore seems timely for the EU counterparts to formulate and 
express their preferences with respect to the terms they desire for their activity 
in the Russian energy sector.
Second, innovations and technology. In the realm of energy coopera-
tion, Russia is eager to expand technical and technological ties that enable the 
development of greenfields located on the Russian continental shelf and in re-
mote Eastern provinces with harsh climatic and difficult geological conditions. 
From this angle, European companies are potentially attractive partners to the 
Russian energy majors. Importantly, Russian tax and customs norms envisage, 
for instance, certain tax and duties breaks and exemptions for importing ma-
chinery and technologies which are vital for Russian economic development but 
not produced domestically.  
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Third, energy efficiency and energy saving. The EU has traditionally 
attached great importance to the issues of environmentally friendly and sustain-
able development;59 meanwhile, Russia has just stepped up its efforts in this 
area.60 For the foreseeable future, Russia will have to play “catch-up” to ensure 
clean, efficient technologies in energy production, transportation, distribution 
and use. 
Concerning the environment for Russia–EU energy cooperation: al-
though it was far from ideal earlier, it has now become even more complicated. 
This is because some of the previously used mechanisms within internationally 
institutionalised frameworks (such as the ECT) and of bilateral scope (such as 
PCA) are no longer employable. A new institutional and organisational setting 
for Russia–EU dialogue has yet to be established and this is linked to Russia’s 
accession to the WTO and the completion of Russia–EU negotiations on a new 
agreement for the bilateral partnership. Meanwhile, the energy dialogue format 
stands as the only expedient means to govern the bilateral R ussia–EU energy 
partnership. 
The Russia–EU negotiation process has often stumbled over obstacles 
from both sides. For the EU, one major problem in pursuing the energy dia-
logue with Russia was the EU’s failure to speak “with one voice”. The ratifica-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty may help in this regard, as may the creation of a new 
joint European External Action Services (EEAS). In addition the adoption of the 
Third Energy Package envisaging the establishment of an Agency for Coopera-
tion between Energy Regulators (ACER) may help achieve greater coherence at 
EU level through closer cooperation with national regulatory authorities, par-
ticularly over cross-border issues. 
Apparently, negotiating an energy agenda with the EU was not that 
satisfactory a process for Russia. This was due to the dialogue mainly being con-
stituted to best ensure the EU’s preferences and mostly satisfy the EU’s expecta-
tions from the energy partnership. Having comprehended this, neither Russia’s 
ECT discourse nor its other energy decisions appear purely assertive or squarely 
aggressive. For this very reason, to become an equal actor in a negotiation proc-
ess, Russia is attempting to shape a new basis for the energy partnership. Again, 
breaking down an existing system with certain evident flaws before introducing 
a new solid alternative may be seen as unconstructive. Nevertheless, deeming 
Russia’s nonparticipation in the existing international frameworks as an indica-
tor of its deliberate unwillingness to develop energy cooperation within a multi-
lateral context is simply wrong. In reality, Russia is trying to become a party to a 
regulatory system which would take into account its prospects. One telling piece 
of evidence of this is the Conceptual Approach to the New Legal Framework for 
Energy Cooperation proposed by the Russian President on April 21 May 2009.
  
New dimensions to be taken into account 
Several aspects have recently come to light that may somehow impact on the 
bilateral Russia–EU energy dialogue. These new dimensions can be presented as 
59 Green Paper European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive, and Secure Energy (March, 
2006); Energy Policy for Europe (January, 2007), Action Plan 2008 and 2009.
60 Federal Law N 261-FZ On Energy Saving and Improving Energy Efficiency, adopted 23 
November 2009.
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shaped largely within the bilateral discourse, informed by developments of more 
or less regional reach (mainly within the CIS context), and expedited by some 
global trends.
Russia has set modernisation as a prime policy aim embracing struc-
tural changes in every segment of the national economy. In this regard, the EU’s 
prompt support for Russia in its programme dubbed “Partnership for Moderni-
zation” is promising for bilateral relations. This EU initiative wholly complies 
with Russia’s concerns about the means to invigorate economic development, 
and constitutes solid grounds for enhanced bilateral cooperation. 
Closely linked to the modernisation programme is the Russian govern-
ment’s concern about enhancing the investment climate. As far as practical steps 
are concerned, the government is scrutinising the development of a comprehen-
sive mechanism favouring investment activity in Russia, including the creation 
of a better business environment for foreign partners. The stimuli under consid-
eration include easing taxation, streamlining customs formalities, and measures 
to improve migration procedures, in particular for skilled labour and so forth. 
Also, a new round of privatisation of large Russian companies planned for 
2010–2011 appears to be a real opportunity for European business to reassess 
the prospects and opportunities for the expansion of its ties with and in Russia.   
Two increasingly important regional aspects may impact on the overall 
discourse of the Russia–EU energy dialogue. First, the long-planned Customs 
Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was officially launched in Janu-
ary 2010. Although this harmonisation of customs regulation is not unprob-
lematic, once the project is fully effectuated (from July 2010), some structural 
changes in the Belarusian and, possibly, Russian downstream sectors may be ex-
pected. Following the spirit of deeper integration, the formation of the Customs 
Union – via mechanisms of economies of scale and the international division of 
labour – may offer better opportunities for Russia–EU cooperation.   
Second, there was a degree of rapprochement in the Russia–Ukraine bi-
lateral discourse after the Ukrainian presidential elections in February 2010. The 
new Ukrainian government’s course of détente in relations with Russia promises 
a more balanced format for the Russia–EU energy partnership. Ukraine’s more 
cooperative spirit seems to have drawn a positive reaction in Russia. While not 
all the signals from both sides can be taken seriously (for instance, Ukraine’s 
proposition to participate in the Nord Stream and South Stream projects), some 
initiatives appear rather attractive (cooperation between Gazprom and Nafto-
gaz in establishing a joint business unit, or tripartite (including the EU) involve-
ment in the modernisation of the Ukrainian GTS). Generally, stronger Russia–
Ukraine relations would certainly enhance bilateral cooperation in the energy 
sector with positive spillovers for the Russia–EU energy partnership. 
On a more global scale, in 2009 Russia’s status as the world’s largest gas 
producer was reportedly usurped by the US. 61 This shift is more than a matter 
of prestige: it has clear practical implications for Russia’s energy strategy and 
accordingly affects the EU. Evidently, the US’ success in developing non-conven-
tional shale gas production drastically changes its energy profile; from being an 
61 In March 2010, however, there were a number of statements that the US shale gas 
production data are very likely to be overestimated. This was explained by difficulties in 
collecting adequate information from numerous rather small-sized producers of shale gas. 
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importer, the US is turning into a self-sufficient gas producer, and possibly even 
into an exporter. Under such circumstances, Russia’s largely US-oriented LNG-
producing Shtokman project appears unfeasible.62 Coupled with the decline in 
EU energy demand, this may effectively signal a possibility for the second phase 
of Nord Stream to be abandoned. Russia’s strategic (mis)calculations may ac-
cordingly be corrected by the market, but given the scale of Russia-based energy 
projects, these shifts are certain to impact on major European energy-related 
businesses, as well as affect overall domestic industrial activity. Accordingly, 
assessing all the grand energy projects from a more united and economically 
sound perspective seems timely.      
 On a more practical note, given the depth of energy interdependency 
between Russia and the EU, and taking into account Gazprom’s recent problems 
with supply and strategic production and investment planning, it is obvious that 
better consistency between the policies of the major supplier and its key consum-
er is needed. Paying due attention and respect to the national regulatory frame-
works in place, some means to improve the situation could still be discussed. For 
instance, exchanging data on energy supply and demand, production activities 
and investment needs would allow the two sides to make well-considered and 
timely decisions and conduct the bilateral energy cooperation more efficiently. 
Another area of traditionally great importance to the EU and also ris-
ing to prominence on Russia’s energy policy agenda is energy saving and energy 
conservation. This seems to be an especially promising area for future Russia–
EU energy dialogue. Although in years past Russia has undertaken certain steps 
(target-setting in the Energy Strategy 2030, law on technical standards and so 
on), its policy remains fragmented. Once a more systemic approach to energy 
saving and efficiency is introduced domestically, international cooperation will 
also become more constructive. In this case, as it possesses the expertise, tech-
nologies and equipment needed by Russia, the EU will certainly be one of the 
key partners.   
Evidently, concrete possibilities for fully fledged Russia–EU coopera-
tion in the energy sector do exist. Although the Russia–EU energy dialogue 
can be characterised by weaknesses, this mechanism also possesses undeniable 
strengths, and must therefore be continued. It now seems important not to let 
the threats originating in the contemporarily loose institutionalisation of the 
dialogue process and the patchy character of the regulatory framework quell the 
opportunities to develop more comprehensive cooperation between Russia and 
the EU. 
Following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is supposed to 
enter a new era of common policy making. The EEAS authorised with a EU’s 
common foreign policy mandate is to become a forum where that very “single 
voice” is to be formulated, a tribune to convey it from and a channel for the 
decisions’ practical implementation. At this stage of setting the EU’s common 
external policy, it is important to position the Russia–EU energy dialogue to en-
sure the advantages of this framework are fully and efficiently utilised. Moreo-
ver, the creation of the Customs Union is a factor to be taken into account. This 
62 A final investment decision will now be reached in 2011 (instead of late 2010); the launch 
of piped gas supply from the field has been postponed from 2013 to 2016; and the launch 
of the LNG phase has been postponed until 2017 (from 2014). 
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integration initiative will to a certain extent influence the EU’s Eastern Neigh-
bourhood Policy. Both sides’ involvements with the Customs Union constitute 
an additional agenda to be considered when formulating the new agreement 
for the Russia–EU strategic partnership. Moreover, perspectives for Russia–EU 
cooperation are to be defined while taking into account developments in the 
international arena, such as Russia’s accession to the WTO.
To grasp EU–Russia bilateral relations, it is important to analyse them 
as evolving in the changing environment at domestic, regional and global levels.
Russia–Central Eurasia: from opportunistic merchant to 
businesslike partner
While numerous studies continue to encapsulate Russia’s behaviour in Central 
Eurasia within the Great Game scenario, this trite vision does not reflect the 
contemporary dynamics of Russia’s involvement with that region.
However, claiming that Russia’s policy transformation has resulted 
from its own calculations would be both naive and erroneous. On the contrary, 
Russia’s policy transformation largely results from the Central Eurasian states’ 
increasingly independent agenda at both regional and international levels. The 
foreign policy of the Central Eurasian countries is underpinned by the principle 
of multipolarity, projections of which can be discerned in the countries’ energy 
policy. The Central Eurasian states allowed greater involvement of foreign in-
vestors in the exploration, exploitation and production of hydrocarbons, which 
triggered the active diversification of energy exports and the development of 
energy transport infrastructure. The circumstances of Russia’s major departure 
from the post-Soviet period’s mode of cooperation were that once the Central 
Eurasian states had developed alternative energy export routes, Russia, which 
had formerly withheld many benefits from selling Central Eurasian carbons to 
Europe, was forced to bring about a new pattern for cooperation. 
What are the testaments of Russia’s changed behaviour? First, one of 
the most notorious components of Russia’s policy towards the Central Eurasian 
states – low prices for imported energy resources – has been eliminated. Accord-
ing to the new agreements, pricing has switched to the European market formu-
la. Another noticeable change pertains to the volumes of Russia’s imports from 
Central Eurasian states. Importantly, Russia’s significantly decreased purchases 
from Turkmenistan are the result of newly concluded agreements in accordance 
with Russia’s proposals. These smaller imports are almost entirely stipulated by 
the modestly recovering demand for gas in the European markets.   
When analysing contemporary Russia’s energy policy in the Central 
Eurasian region, it is important to note that it is influenced by the activity of dif-
ferent types of actors at several occasionally overlapping layers.   
Within the larger context of Central Asia, if not cooperation, then co-
ordination of interests with China became Russia’s policy choice. This is espe-
cially evident in Russia’s energy relations with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan and with regard to the TUKC gas pipeline project.
In the Caspian region, Russia plays only a part in a play, the rules of 
which are formulated by a number of regional and external actors pursuing 
intertwined interests. Azerbaijan is one of the centres attracting increasing atten-
tion. Explicit interests in the energy sector can be discerned in the involvement 
of various foreign companies in the region, such as BP (UK), Statoil (Norway), 
Total (France), Itochu and Impex (Japan), Chevron and ExxonMobile (US), 
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RWE (Germany) and so forth. However, there are also geopolitical issues, sig-
nificantly, the Azerbaijan–Turkey discourse. Turkey is one of the regional pow-
ers with expanding ambitions. Indeed, Turkey has increased its efforts to play 
a greater role in the Azeri/Armenian détente and has activated a course of rap-
prochement with Armenia. While these moves directly affect Russia’s status in 
the region, Turkey–Azerbaijan relations more than anything else define Russia’s 
energy ties with Azerbaijan and, subsequently, Russia’s stance on the European 
market. Simultaneously, the significance for Russia of an alliance with Turkey 
originates in the latter’s officially proclaimed course of becoming a major energy 
hub for transporting oil and gas from the Caspian region, the Middle East and 
the Gulf to the European market. It remains to be seen, but before the Russia–
Ukraine rapprochement began, there were expectations that intensified Russo-
Turkish contacts could result in the realisation of Blue Stream II, which could 
replace the transit route for Russian gas exports to Europe through Ukraine. 
Similarly, in the oil segment, the projected Samsun–Ceyhan oil pipeline could 
potentially deliver oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean via Turkey, thus 
enabling the enlargement of exports and solidifying Russo-Kazakh energy links.    
Another prominent actor by the Caspian, but notorious for shaking 
up the entire edifice of global affairs, is Iran. The importance of Iran for Rus-
sia comes from several areas. First, there is Iran’s nuclear program. On the one 
hand, certain responsibilities are incumbent upon Russia as one of the five per-
manent members of the UNSC. From this angle, Russia may have a certain 
degree of influence on Iran. On the other hand, Russia is genuinely interested 
in Iran being freed of UNSC sanctions, as its oil, gas and nuclear power sectors 
promise ample commercial opportunities for Russian private companies and 
state-owned enterprises. Second, although Iran is currently an observer to the 
SCO, it is seeking membership claiming this would be consistent with its ‘look-
ing East’ foreign policy. Russia, as one of founders and one of the most influen-
tial powers in the SCO, could back Iran’s accession. However, because of Iran’s 
nuclear programme, Russia has chosen a prudent position, neither supporting 
nor opposing the accession. Third, Iran is the world’s second largest possessor of 
gas and a member of the GECF. Russia and Iran, already outstanding gas actors, 
may increase their influence in global gas affairs, especially assuming the GECF 
evolves into an OPEC-like format. From this angle, Russia is naturally con-
cerned about maintaining amicable relations with Iran. Even beyond the GECF 
format, cooperation with Iran may provide Russia with at least some guarantee 
that the two countries will not be competing for the same gas export markets. 
Balancing all these multidimensional connections is vitally important 
to Russia. With pipeline projects still mushrooming, the majority of whose sup-
ply intake is envisaged as originating in Central Eurasia, Russia’s very existence 
as Europe’s major energy supplier depends on cooperation with Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Iran as significant producers and ex-
porters, and with Turkey as a reliable tier of the energy transit chain to be estab-
lished. Overall, it may be concluded that Russia is forming closer interlinkages 
with the regional Central Eurasian powers to secure its pragmatic interests well 
beyond regional borders, particularly in Europe and China. In so doing, Russia 
is composing a new pattern of cooperation with the Central Eurasian states, 
a pattern where Russia’s ultimate benefits are becoming less definite or even 
shrinking, depending on the policy course of the counterparts and third parties 
involved.               
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Russia–Northeast Asia: from inconsistent actor to mature 
state entrepreneur
Asia was not a priority in Russian energy policy until the 2000s when Russian 
private oil and gas businesses, led by Yukos and inspired by Khodorkovsky, 
proposed a grand design for international cooperation with China and North 
America. This was based on the energy resources of Russia’s eastern provinces. 
The narrative is well-known: in 2004, the state rather swiftly redrew the plan 
revolving around Yukos’ vision, but did not embark on its implementation as 
hurriedly. It took several years for a principle decision to be made concerning a 
spatial format for Russia’s involvement with the countries of Northeast Asia – 
‘the China card’, ‘China and beyond’ or Northeast Asia. During this lingering 
vagueness, the Northeast Asian states were attempting to suggest to Russia their 
visions of possible formats and offer various means to enhance energy coop-
eration. While Russia vacillated, the Northeast Asia states entered a ‘scramble 
for Russian energy’. Once the decision was made and it became clear that the 
Russian government was set to play a key role in developing the oil and gas 
sectors in eastern Russia, the Northeast Asia states started demonstrating their 
interest. This aspect – the possibility for government-to-government agreements 
as a means to guarantee the energy security of both sides involved – played a 
positive role in the Northeast Asia states’ aspirations to embark on more exten-
sive participation in energy projects in eastern Russia. The number of Northeast 
Asian-based NOCs and smaller business units entering oil and gas segments in 
the Russian east has increased significantly.  
The role of inter-governmental contacts within the Northeast Asian 
context is worth emphasising. Bilateral ties involve various actors, but in North-
east Asia companies do not usually involve themselves in activities unless gov-
ernmental agreements have been struck. To some degree, this is because the gov-
ernment in this situation is regarded as the most credible actor and guarantor 
(despite the great variation in the systems of the Northeast Asian states, ranging 
from market capitalism to socialism). Also, Northeast Asia’s regionalism (pri-
marily framed by functionalist thinking) remains very weak and this contributes 
to the overall environment for cooperation, which is significantly different from 
what is observed in Europe, or North America, or even in South-East Asia. 
Largely due to these attributes of the region, Russia’s policy-making rather fairly 
complies with the Northeast Asian states’ norms and even acts as a catalyst en-
hancing energy cooperation on this flank.   
Problems with energy transit through the post-Soviet states led Russia 
to realise clearly the need to revise its geographical priorities to utilise the ben-
efits of direct access to diversified export markets. Based on this, Russia stepped 
up the Asian vector in its energy policy and embarked on strengthening ties with 
the Northeast Asia nations. A leap forward in the form of the implementation 
of the East Siberian and Far Eastern energy projects (Sakhalin I and II and ESPO 
in particular) testifies to Russia`s eagerness to attain the goals in national policy 
papers through bilateral coordination with the Northeast Asian states. There 
have been numerous twists and turns in the Russian position with regard to 
Sakhalin I and II and the ESPO and Altai developments, which seem settled at 
present. The near-future prospects for multilateral cooperation in Russia’s east 
may be presented as revolving around these major projects.
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To address the question of the viability of the government-to-govern-
ment format for Russia’s cooperation with the Northeast Asia troika, some com-
parative lines between the Northeast Asian states’ national energy policies may 
be drawn. There are certain commonalities which derive from similar concerns 
about a deep dependency on energy import. Such include the high concentra-
tion of imports from a limited number of suppliers (dependency on the Middle 
East as a major threat), the high volatility of energy markets, the deteriorating 
environment and so forth. As a whole, these factors justify a government’s more 
active involvement. 
To commence energy cooperation with Northeast Asian states and en-
sure the development of this, the Russian government has offered unprecedented 
fiscal and other incentives. As the institutionalisation is rather weak of the mul-
tilateral cooperation in the Northeast Asian region, the policy framework is 
chiefly informed by bilateral intergovernmental agreements and energy dialogue 
formats. Importantly, provisions on a ‘regional component’ envisaging the en-
hanced economic development of East Siberia and the Russian Far East are the 
key elements of both agreement and dialogue formats.   
Asianisation as a policy course is deeply pragmatic. There are objective 
factors increasing the attractiveness of the Northeast Asian market, such as an 
already significant level of energy demand, which is projected to grow (whereas 
the trend in the EU is stable or even declining). The geographical proximity of 
the Northeast Asian states is also particularly favourable, granting Russia direct 
access to Northeast Asian consumer markets without any transit or intermedi-
ary issues involved. Furthermore, the resource base adds to the attractiveness of 
the Asian markets: in the Russian east, the resource base is largely untouched 
(unlike in the intensively exploited provinces of Western Siberia), but believed to 
contain huge reserves. The logic of advancing the socio-economic development 
of Russia’s eastern regions through the synergic effect of enlarged, international 
energy cooperation with the Northeast Asian countries is also incorporated in 
the policy-making process.63
63 The importance of this aspect is specifically underlined in the Programme for Effective 
Utilisation of Foreign Political Factors on a Systematic Basis for Purposes of Long-Term 
Development of the Russian Federation (February 2010).
41
Conclusion
Russia’s long-term export dependence is the essential ‘precondition’ for its en-
ergy security concerns. Any prolonged disruption in its exports or a significant 
decrease in its volumes would undermine the ability of the Russian government 
and industry to sustain economic development, ultimately threatening national 
security. Russia’s foreign energy policy serves to create a vitally important ca-
pacity to reduce Russia’s vulnerability and maintain its energy security. Over the 
last two decades, Russia’s foreign energy policy has been redefined against the 
backdrop of sweeping changes at systemic, transnational and domestic levels, 
and it can be expected to transform further towards acquiring features of a more 
nuanced system. 
Historically rooted in the intellectual debate about Russia’s role in the 
world and its way of development, the “whether East or West?” dilemma nat-
urally has certain projections on Russia’s foreign energy policy. Nonetheless, 
contemporary Russian energy policy is no longer a choice between staying West 
or going East; a combination of (geo)-political/economic considerations has re-
sulted in a multidimensional policy. Moreover, bearing in mind that Russia’s 
counterparts (in Europe, Central Eurasia and Northeast Asia) are pursuing en-
ergy security by diversifying the sources of imports/markets for exports, there 
is even a certain degree of compatibility between the policies of Russia and the 
other states concerned. 
Dynamism in international energy relations can be achieved only 
through strategically oriented cooperation built upon comprehensive institu-
tional and legislative frameworks. From this perspective, Russian energy rela-
tions with Europe and Central Asia – as compared to those with the Northeast 
Asian states – are more solidly established. However, the ongoing remapping 
of pipeline routes in the west, accompanied by emerging large-scale projects 
in Russia’s east, may significantly alter Russia’s present interdependency with 
Europe. This move towards Asia will inevitably be accompanied by a gradual 
institutionalisation of frameworks and instruments. 
This study has shown that Russia’s foreign energy policy had been 
evolving throughout the transition period, and is still changing to tackle new 
domestic and external challenges and seize opening opportunities. These various 
shifts in Russia’s energy policy can be characterised as follows. 
Towards Europe, Russia’s policy course is changing from one typical of 
an assured supplier towards a pattern of a reliable partner. The primary reason 
for this shift derives from the profoundly symmetrical energy interdependence of 
the two sides. Regular transit conflicts directly affecting the EU’s energy security 
and the EU’s retaliatory measures to counterbalance the risks associated with 
supplies originating from Russia have led to Russia eventually realising that 
maintaining an assertive policy line is a precarious path. Accordingly, Russia 
has started paying due respect to its customers’ national regulations on domestic 
energy markets and is demonstrating greater readiness for energy policy coordi-
nation. This behavioural shift has also been advanced by rapprochements with 
some transit countries, first and foremost Ukraine, but also Poland. Russia’s 
own aspirations for domestic, technical and technological progress, also in the 
fuel energy complex, and innovative growth based on an energy-efficient econo-
my, have definitely played a pivotal role. The EU readily responded to Russia’s 
developmental ambitions by offering its backing in the form of the Partnership 
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for Modernisation initiative. In sum, this already well-established cooperation, 
which is also the most diversified, appears to be the partnership to help attain 
Russia’s ambitious goals of sustainable economic development. 
As regards the Central Eurasian energy resources, Russia seems to have 
departed from the course of an opportunistic merchant who took full advantage 
of some residual Soviet-era practices and benefited from the geographical loca-
tion of major oil and gas pipelines which allowed Central Eurasian exports only 
through Russian territory. Nowadays, Russia is increasingly ushered towards a 
relationship between businesslike partners: this implies that gaining any energy 
deal involves negotiation and bargaining over the terms of price and volume. 
Certainly, the shift in Russia’s policy towards the region was expedited by the 
policy course of the Central Eurasian countries which was called multi-vectored 
energy policy. This policy, vigorously pursued by the Central Eurasian states, 
has created a more competitive environment for international energy coopera-
tion in the region and successfully launched the process of the diversification of 
the external energy links of the Central Eurasian states. Although the costs of 
Russia’s energy policy here have definitely increased, the region remains very 
attractive as a bridgehead to expand the Russian NOCs’ overseas operations. It 
also offers an opportunity to optimise Russia’s energy flows and export routes 
and a means to advance the economic integration of the post-Soviet states.
The transformations in Russia’s behavioural pattern on the Northeast 
Asian regional energy scene can best be described as a move from an inconsist-
ent actor towards a policy of mature state entrepreneur. Indeed, a number of 
ambitious Russia-based cross-border projects were uncertain for nearly a dec-
ade. Such uncertainty was dispelled when the Russian government clarified its 
goals for energy cooperation with the Northeast Asian states, proclaimed the 
Asian vector as a major principle of Russia’s energy policy, and subsequently 
proposed a system of fiscal and financial incentives and administrative levers 
designed specifically to commence the development of Asia-oriented energy ties. 
By developing cooperation with the neighbouring economies in Northeast Asia, 
the Russian government is attempting to address one particular concern: the 
social and economic enhancement of Russia’s vast eastern territories. Taking 
into account all the synergic effects associated with energy sector development, 
this policy approach appears well-founded, and the eastwards move seems rea-
sonable. Another significant aspect of developing energy cooperation with the 
Northeast Asian states originates in the prospect of diversifying Russia’s energy 
exports away from the perilously profound dependence on European demand.           
Objectively, not only benefits can be expected from these major shifts 
in Russia’s foreign energy policy; there are also serious threats to handle and 
weaknesses to eliminate. Schematically, some principal outcomes of the trans-
formation of Russia’s foreign energy policy can be depicted in a SWOT analysis 
(see Table 3).   
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Strengths Weaknesses
Opening up new large markets;
Possibility for rule setting through 
negotiation and bargaining; 
Full benefits from energy export 
diversification (oil, gas, LNG); 
Opportunities for transit-free 
links; 
Synergy through modernisation 
in the sector;
 
Immense expenses and efforts associated 
with implementation of Asian vector;
Eastbound policy is driven by political 
and geo-political factors, many of which 
are uncontrollable; 
Europe may irreversibly 
diversify away from Russian 
supplies;
Economic costs of grand 
shift towards Asia may not be 
recoupable; 
 
New oil blend brand (higher price for 
Russian oil);
New centre for oil & gas trade in Asia;
Rapprochement with FSU (e.g. Ukraine), 
and post-Soviet (Poland) partners;
Rationalisation of energy flows (gradual 
switch from maturing to growing mar-
kets);




As the matrix above shows, the shifts in Russia’s foreign energy policy could 
generate an array of positive spillovers, some of which (for instance, the pros-
pect of a higher price for Russian oil blends) had not been anticipated until the 
gradual materialisation of the Asian vector had started.    
To sum up, Russia’s foreign energy policy transformation is unfolding 
through three major processes, those in the realms of geography, economics 
and politics. In principal, Russia’s simultaneous involvement with both the West 
and the East is defined by the logic of the concept of Eurasianism. At times 
when specific Russia’s practices are absolutely incompatible with Western val-
ues (e.g. free competition, the rule of law, the transparency of decision-making 
processes and so forth), more flexibility and cooperativeness can be attained 
through the partnerships in the East. It can thus be argued that considerations 
of pragmatism significantly define Russia’s foreign energy policy objectives and 
act as principal driving forces behind the transformations in every respective 
geographical dimension. The origins of the policy shifts are not so simple as 
to be strictly identified. In most instances, the momentum behind the policy 
transformations is prepared by a number of factors, which generally, mainly for 
analytical purposes, can be divided into two major classes: political (geo-polit-
Table 3 Ramifications of Russia’s West-Centre-East energy policy shifts: SWOT analysis.
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ical) and economic (geo-economic). In reality, nonetheless, this divide is rather 
conventional, and the policy-making involves a permanent trade-off, balancing 
between and combining economic and political reasoning. Russia, for instance, 
has frequently been blamed for its politically motivated stance as regards energy 
supply to the EU, but practice shows otherwise. In the West, Russia is largely 
guided by the prospect of attaining a lucrative economic prize, while on the 
Eastern flank, security considerations predominate over commercial thinking. 
Lastly, Russia’s foreign energy policy is influenced by a multipolarity concept, 
which implies safeguarding a secure environment for sustainable domestic de-
velopment, maintaining regional stability and enhancing comprehensive inter-
national cooperation. 
Russia’s foreign energy policy should be perceived as a ‘permanent’ stra-
tegic problem. As a function of the country’s industrial structure, resource al-
location and geopolitical location, it is certain to appear as a critical issue in the 
future, though in what way depends on the course of economic and political 
trends unfolding both internally and externally.
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